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A KIND OF JUDGMENT: SEARCHING FOR
JUDICIAL NARRATIVES AFTER DEATH
TIMOTHY WILLIAM WATERS*

ABSTRACT

Much of internationalcriminal law's attractionrests on the 'authoritative narrative theory '--the claim that legal judgment creates incontestable narrativesthat serve as the foundation, or at least a baseline, for
post-conflict reconciliation. So what happens when there is no judgment? This is the situation that confronted the International Criminal
Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia when its most prominent defendant,
Slobodan Milosevic, died. By turning scholarship'sattention towards a
terminated trial, this Article develops an indirect but powerful challenge
to one of the dominant views about what internationalcriminal law is
for, with interdisciplinary implicationsfor human rights, international
relations, diplomacy, and political science.
What can be salvagedfrom the terminated Milo~evic trial? One candidate for substitute judgment was the Decision on the Motion for
Acquittal brought under the Tribunal's Rule 98bis. Halfway through
the trial, when the prosecution rested, the Trial Chamber had to decide
whether there was a case to answer. The Chamber declared that the trial
should go forward, though what the judges actually decided was necessarily ambiguous: The prosecution had presented enough evidence that a
court could find Milofevic guilty-but they didn't say that this court
would.
Since there never was a final verdict, the decision has become a site of
contestation and ambiguous value. This Article examines how the prosecution, defense, chambers, and outsiders deployed the Rule 98bis Decision to tell a story about Milofevic's guilt or innocence and craft a final
judgment in the eyes of the world, if not in the law. The doctrinal constraints on these efforts suggest real limits on internationalcriminal
law's ability to craft authoritative and transformative narratives
through any trialprocess short offinaljudgment. Byforensically exploring these limits, the Article also indicates parametersfor an even more
consequentialinvestigation into whether the strong version of the authoritative narrative theory works under any circumstances.
Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. J.D. 1999,
Harvard Law School; M.I.A. 1998, Columbia University; B.A. 1989, UCLA. Thanks to
Professors Hannah Buxbaum, Nancy Combs, Mark Drumbl, Kevin Jon Heller, Susan Williams, and Richard Wilson; participants in the conference The Miloevie Trial: An Autopsy;
and students in my course on the Milokevie trial-in particular Alec Hass-for thoughtful
comments on early drafts. Thanks, finally, to Laura Coquard-Patry and Huong Nguyen for
excellent research assistance.
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NARRATIVE OF TRANSFORMATION, TERMINATED

One of the most common, if also most contested, claims for the
efficacy of international criminal tribunals is that they produce
authoritative narratives, which in turn contribute to reconciliation.' The key element in this claim is a court's final judgment.
While many parts of a trial contribute to the production of narratives-such as the giving of testimony, introduction of documents,
or the creation of archives-only the decisions of the court carry
the imprimatur of official, consequential authority. This is especially true given the largely adversarial nature of the principal
international tribunals: 2 Evidence submitted by one party and critiqued by the other is, by its nature, subject to and indeed the product of partisan interpretation, and it is the role of the judge to
determine that evidence's ultimate value. It is judgmentgrounded in the procedural integrity of the trial and sitting at the
apex of the process-that produces the dispositive, displacing
authority claimed for international criminal law's interpretations of
violent conflict.
A contested claim, to be sure, but assuming one finds it plausible, what happens when there is no final judgment? Assuming one
believes in the authoritative, transformative power of international
criminal law (ICL) and its judgments, what can be salvaged from a
terminated trial? This is precisely the question that confronted the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
1.

See, e.g., About the ICTY, INTr'L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER YuGosLAvA, http://

www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY (last visited Apr. 3, 2011) ("The Tribunal has contributed to an indisputable historical record, combating denial and helping communities
come to terms with their recent history. Crimes across the region can no longer be
denied."); The Hague Tribunaland Balkan Reconciliation, INST. FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING
(Feb. 15, 2010), http://www.iwpr.net/report-news/hague-tribunal-and-balkan-reconciliation ("The website of the ICTY boasts that in the light of the court's work, 'It is now not
tenable for anyone to dispute the reality of the crimes that were committed in and around
Bratunac, Brcko, Celebici, Dubrovnik, Foca, Prijedor, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, and Zvornik to
name but a few.' But the fact is that across the region, many people continue to do just
that."); see also ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE 24, 26-28 (2007) (discussing this claim and contestations of it); DIANE F.
ORENTLICHER, THAT SOMEONE GUILTY BE PUNISHED: THE IMPACT OF THE ICTY IN BOSNIA

39-42 (2010).
2. See GEERT-JAN

ALEXANDER KNOOPS, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL AND

(describing the principally adversarial nature of international tribunals, though identifying a shift toward inquisitorial
traits).
INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 6-9 (2005)
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(ICTY)-its chamber, prosecution, defense, and indeed all actors
with an interest in either the general project of ICL or its particular
effects in the former Yugoslavia-when Slobodan Milogevic died. 3
The trial of Slobodan Milogevic 4 was supposed to be the "historymaking" 5 flagship case for the ICTY-the "capstone of the tribunal's somewhat improbable rise from the margins of the international arena to that of a serious international institution." 6 The
"Butcher of the Balkans" to some, to others the "[S]avior of the
Serbs," 7 as Serbia's leader from the late 1980s to 2000 Milogevic was
a critical player in the collapse of Yugoslavia and the violent wars of
its dissolution. His exact role in and responsibility for those conflicts, as well as the role of the Serbian state apparatus he headed,
however, were contested questions," which his trial promised to
finally answer.
It was clear, too, when Milogevic was transferred to The Hague in
2001, that the transformative potential of ICL had not yet produced any demonstrable reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia.
3. See, e.g., Paul Tavernier, The Death of Slobodan Milosevic and the Future of International
Criminaljustice,HAGUEJUSTICE PORTAL (Apr. 5, 2006), http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/
eCache/DEF/5/351/TG1Ug.html (raising questions, in light of the trial's termination,
regarding the function of judicial institutions and the expectations of the international
community in seeing former dictators brought to justice and historical truths established).
4. See generally Prosecutor v. Milogevi6, Case No. IT-02-54-T, First Amended Indictment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 23, 2002) (describing the crimes
with which Milogevie was charged).
5. JUDITH ARMATTA, TWILIGHT OF IMPUNITY. THE WAR CRIMES TRIAL OF SLOBODAN
MILOSEVIC 1 (2010).
6. David Tolbert, The International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia: Unforeseen Successes and ForeseeableShortcomings, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Summer/Fall 2002, at
7, 8; see also Transcript of Opening Statement by Carla Del Ponte at 7-8, Prosecutor v.
Milogevit, Case No. IT-02-54-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 12, 2002)
("With the trial of this particular accused, we reach a turning point of this institution. The
proceeding upon which the Chamber embarks today is clearly the most important trial to
be conducted in the Tribunal to date. Indeed, it may prove to be the most significant trial
that this institution will ever undertake."); Milan Markovic, In the Interests ofJustice?: A Critique of the ICTY Trial Court'sDecision to Assign Counsel to Slobodan Milosevic, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 947, 947 (2005) ("The Milosevic trial was hailed as a momentous event for both the
[ICTY] and international justice as a whole."); Michael P. Scharf, The Legacy of the Milosevic
Tria 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 915, 916 (2003) ("Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic is clearly the
trial for which the Ad Hoc Court was created.").
7. Lenard J. Cohen, The Miloevie Dictatorship:InstitutionalizingPower and Ethno-Populism in Serbia, in BALKAN STRONGMEN: DICTATORS AND AUTHORITARIAN RULERS OF SOUTH
EASTERN EUROPE 425, 432 (BerndJ. Fischer ed., 2007) (quoting Dugan Janji6, Od Etniciteta
ka Nacionalizmu, in KULTURE U TRANZIcIp 29 (Mirjana Prosi&Dvonid ed., 1994)); James L.
Graft, William Mader &J.F.O. McAllister, Slobodan Milosevic: The Butcher of the Balkans, TIME,
June 8, 1992, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,975723-,00.html.
8. See generally NORMAN CIGAR & PAUL WILLIAMS, INDICTMENT AT THE HAGUE: THE
MILOsEVi( REGIME AND CRIMES OF THE BALKAN WAR (2002) (examining the role of Serbian
authorities in the war through key documents).
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The various communities in the successor states to Yugoslavia held
radically different visions of the wars' origins, of who was a victim
and who a perpetrator, and what constituted justice. 9 Milogevic's
trial therefore promised to be the single greatest test of the tribunal's and ICL's ability to forge an efficacious and transformative
narrative.1 0 Thus, it was all the more disappointing when Milogevic
died four years into the trial, before judgment could be rendered.
The sudden termination of trials by death is not a hypothetical
problem, nor is Miloevic the only such instance. A surprisingly
large share of international war crimes defendants die before their
trials can be finished-nearly ten percent at the ICTY, higher at
some other tribunals"-and given the nature of the conflicts that
international criminal tribunals adjudicate and the continuing
problems of enforcing indictments, 1 2 we can expect that the problem of defendants dying before judgment will continue to occur
with regularity at the International Criminal Court and ad hoc
tribunals. If, therefore, judgment is indeed essential to the ICL's
transformative potential, there will be a significant number of cases
in which that potential will be unrealized.

9.

See,

e.g.,

ROLAND

KOSTIo,

AMBIVALENT

PEACE:

EXTERNAL

PEACEBUILDING,

320 (2007)
(reporting data from 2005 survey in Bosnia that found, inter alia, the following definitions
of the war by ethnicity: "Civil war" - 3.7 percent of Bosniaks, 16.7 percent of Croats, and
83.6 percent of Serbs; "Aggression" - 95.1 percent of Bosniaks, 73.2 percent of Croats, and
9 percent of Serbs); Dan Saxon, ExportingJustice: Perceptions of the ICTY Among the Serbian,
Croatian, and Muslim Communities in the Former Yugoslavia, 4J. HUM. RTs. 559, 563-67 (2005)
(describing different perceptions of the fairness of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) between Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs). But see Sanja
Kutnjak Ivkovic & John Hagan, The Politics of Punishment and the Siege of Sarajevo: Toward a
Conflict Theory ofPerceived International(In)Justice, 40 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 369, 393 (2006) (noting that in surveys conducted in 2000 and 2003 in Bosnia "perceptions of the ICTYs fairness were little influenced by the respondents' ethnicity").
10. Scharf, supra note 6, at 916 (offering the view that the trial would "dictate the
ultimate success or failure of the Tribunal itself as a mechanism for restoring peace in the
Balkans").
11. See infra Part I.C.
12. See Lilian A. Barria & Steven D. Roper, How Effective are InternationalCriminal Tribunals? An Analysis of the ICTY and the ICTI 9 INT'LJ. HUM. RTs. 349, 349 (2005) (noting that
problems with apprehending suspects has reduced deterrent effect); James Blount Griffin,
Note, A PredictiveFrameworkfor the Effectiveness of InternationalCriminal Tribunals,34 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 405, 406-07 (2001) ("The enforcement of international criminal law, however, depends upon the unified political will and military power of the alliance that supports the international tribunal. Without the power of coercion, there is little or no
enforcement."); Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement in International Criminal Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 321, 358-64 (2000) (describing the lack of
enforcement as one of the greatest weaknesses of international criminal law (ICL)).
THREATENED

IDENTITY AND

RECONCILIATION

IN

BOSNIA AND

HERZEGOVINA
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This Article considers how different actors have sought to characterize the meaning of the terminated Milo~evic trial in relation to
this idea that courts produce consequential authoritative narratives. In particular, the Article examines efforts to deploy and
interpret the one document that, more than any other, might be
thought of as a substitute for judgment: the Trial Chamber's Rule
1
98bis Decision on the Motion to Acquit. 3
Halfway through the trial, when the prosecution rested, the
chamber had to decide if there was a case to answer. 14 In the
chamber's Decision, issued in June 2004, the judges declared the
trial should go forward, though what they decided was necessarily
ambiguous: The prosecution had presented enough evidence that
a court could find Milogevic guilty, but the judges did not say that
this court would.1 5 The Decision, therefore, had an essentially
interim quality, but because Milogevic died before a final verdict
was issued, the Decision has become a site of contestation-"the
only pre-Judgement determinative ruling of the Chamber on the
16
case."
This Article examines how the accused, amici curiae,prosecution,
chambers, and outsiders have deployed the Decision to tell a story
about Milogevic's guilt or innocence and craft a final judgment in
the eyes of the world, if not in law. Part I surveys claims that ICL
judgments function as authoritative narratives that contribute to
post-conflict transformation in unique ways. Next, after reviewing
the history of the Miloevic trial, Part II examines the Decision
itself-in particular its standard of review, which is nearly identical
to the common law "no case to answer." Part III then shows how
the divergent strategic interests of the various parties in the trial
13. Prosecutor v. Milogevi , Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgement
of Acquittal (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former YugoslaviaJune 16, 2004), availableat http://
www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan-milosevic/tdec/en/040616.htm.
14. See GIDEON BOAS, THE MILOSEVIc TRIAL: LESSONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF COMPLEX
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 121-23 (2007) (noting that after the prosecution
closed its case, the amici curiae filed their motion for judgment of acquittal on Milogevie's
behalf).
15. See Milogevie, Decision on Motion forJudgement of Acquittal
288 ("On the basis
of the inference that may be drawn from the evidence . . . a Trial Chamber could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused was a participant in the joint criminal
enterprise. .. .") (emphasis added); id.
298 ("On the basis of the evidence . .. a Trial
Chamber could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused aided and abetted
or was complicit in the commission of the crime of genocide in that he had knowledge of
the joint criminal enterprise, and that he gave its participants substantial assistance, being
aware that its aim and intention was the destruction of a part of the Bosnian Muslim as a
group.") (emphasis added); see also discussion infta Parts II.C, III.D.
16. BOAS, supra note 14, at 80.
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created asymmetrical expectations about the purposes of the Decision and its content. Part IV examines responses to the Decision
when it was issued-when it was assumed to be an interim step,
rather than the last pronouncement the chamber would makeand finds, already then, critical elisions that appear to give the
Decision the qualities of a judgment. Part V continues this reasoning, showing the ways in which, after Milogevic's death, different
actors tried to use the Decision as a quasi-judgment. 17 In particular, the International Court of Justice's Bosnian Genocide case shows
both the possibilities and the limitations of deploying the Decision
as a quasi-judgment. Lastly, Part VI concludes that the Decision's
constraints show the tenuous nature of the ICL project, one of the
principal justifications for which is radically contingent on reaching final judgment.
Going further, a close reading of the Decision indicates some
parameters for an even more consequential inquiry into how real
or limited the potential of final judgments is in achieving post-conflict transformation: it suggests, counterfactually, the proper scope
for a test of the authoritative narrative theory. But although the
analysis in this Article helps lay the groundwork for that broader
theoretical investigation, its immediate purpose is forensic-a dissection of the Decision, its internal logic and institutional context,
and the uses to which it was put once that context was radically
disrupted by the Miloevic trial's sudden termination.
I.

THE CONCEPT OF JUDGMENT As AUTHORITATIVE NARRATIVE

A.

The Authoritative Narrative Theory:

Many justifications are advanced for the project of ICL.18 One of
its principal rationales is based on ICL's capacity to cut through
17. I have restricted my analysis to the international legal sphere: courts and international organizations commenting on their activity. This leaves out an important set of

actors: the people of the former Yugoslavia. Certainly, the ways in which journalists, politicians, and private individuals in the most affected societies talked about the Decision is
important to a complete discussion of the Decision's contribution to creation of an authoritative narrative. However, for this Article, my primary methodological focus is doctrinal
and logical; I wish to show what the Decision is structurally able to support, and to this end
its formal, doctrinal use within international law is probative. I plan to review the actual
deployment of the Decision (and the initial Indictment) in the former Yugoslavia in a
separate paper.
18. See U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and TransitionalJustice in Conflict and
Post-Conflict Societies: Rep. of the Secretay-Genera,
38, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23,
2004) (describing the objectives of ad hoc criminal tribunals as "bringing to justice those
responsible for serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law, putting an end to
such violations and preventing their recurrence, securing justice and dignity for victims,
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endemic partisan contestation and render incontestable, authoritative judgment about the events of divisive conflict; this authority
undermines or drives out alternative claims and histories, creating
space for shared understanding of truth, which, in turn, may serve
as a prerequisite for reconciliation.1 9 This rationale, which appears
in many forms, is controversial and contested, but also deeply
entrenched in both practice and scholarship; we may call it the
"authoritative narrative theory" of ICL.
The authoritative narrative theory begins with an uncontroversial observation: In societies that have suffered violent conflict and
horrendous war crimes, often along ethnic or sectarian lines,
shared understandings about history and identity will often have
been comprehensively destroyed.2 0 Theorists and practitioners of
post-conflict reconstruction commonly suggest that repairing these
points of social connection is as important as restoring infrastructure, 2 1 and that some form of post-conflict justice-or even formal
establishing a record of past events, promoting national reconciliation, re-establishing the
rule of law and contributing to the restoration of peace"); cf David S. Koller, TheFaith of the
InternationalCriminalLawyer, 40 N.Y.U.J. IrN'L L. & POL. 1019, 1019-23 (2008) (critiquing
the main justifications of international criminal law).
19. See, e.g., About the ICTY, supra note I ("For example, it has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt that the mass murder at Srebrenica was genocide."); see also GeneralInformation, INT'L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, http://www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/Generallnformation/tabid/101/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 3, 2011) ("The purpose of this
measure is to contribute to the process of national reconciliation in Rwanda and to the
maintenance of peace in the region."). Reconciliation was mentioned as a goal in the
resolution establishing the Rwanda Tribunal. See S.C. Res. 955, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
955 (Nov. 8, 1994) ("Convinced that in the particular circumstances of Rwanda, the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law...
would contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace."). On the production of history through trials generally, see RICHARD
ASHBY WILSON, WRITING HISTORY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS (2011)(including discussion of Milofevic); LAWRENCE DouGLAs, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT: MAKING LAW AND
HISTORY IN THE TRIALS OF THE HOLOcAusr (2001).
20. See, e.g., Sanela Basic, Bosnian Society on the Path to Justice, Truth and Reconciliation, in
PEACEBUILDING AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: TEN YEARS AFTER DAYrON 357,
367 (Martina Fischer ed., 2006), availableat http://www.berghof-conflictresearch.org/documents/publications/daytone basic_rec.pdf (noting that in a comparison of how Bosnian
textbooks treat the war, "one can only conclude that there is a sharp and profound disagreement with regard to this issue that both reflects and cements former ethnic divisions.... [R]egarding the nature of the conflict three explanatory models are being used:
in textbooks for Serb pupils there was a civil war, in history books for Bosniaks the same
event is described as aggression, whereas in the textbooks for Croat pupils it was a defensive war").
21. See, e.g., INT'L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, RECONCILIATION
AFTER VIOLENT CONvLICT: A HANDBOOK 23 (David Bloomfield et al. eds., 2003), available at
http://www.idea.int/publications/reconciliation/upload/reconciliation
full.pdf (mentioning "historical accounting via truth-telling" along with "reparation of the material and
psychological damage inflicted on the victims" as techniques of reconciliation); Michile
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criminal trials-is essential to the restoration and maintenance of
22
peace.
The strong version of the authoritative narrative theory - the
view that accepts not only trial's role in creating truths, but their
consequential value-follows this line of reasoning, arguing that
formal criminal justice is not only an essential part of restoration,
but also particularly efficacious.2 3 The problem in post-conflict
societies is that shared, generally respected understandings have
been destroyed, and these are precisely what court judgments provide. The formal legal authority that attaches to a court judgment
is different from mere opinion: (1) judgment has both the power
of the state (or of the international community) behind it and the
legitimacy of a neutral, professional judiciary; (2) a court's pronouncements follow trials that accord different views the opportunity to be weighed in a procedurally balanced forum; and (3) the
court's powers of subpoena and contempt help assure that inforFlournoy & Michael Pan, Dealing with Demons: Justice and Reconciliation, WASH. Q., Autumn
2002, at 111, 111-12, available at http://www.twq.com/02autumn/flournoy.pdf ("Grouping the concepts ofjustice and reconciliation together may strike some as inconsistent, but
the two share a common objective-addressing past abuses and ongoing grievances arising
from the conflict ....
[P]ostconflict societies often require the introduction of accountability and restorative justice mechanisms to break cycles of impunity and violence."); John
J. Hamre & Gordon R. Sullivan, Toward Postconflict Reconstruction,WASH. Q., Autumn 2002,
at 85, 91, available at http://www.twq.com/02autumn/hamre.pdf (stating that "Ij]ustice
and reconciliation addresses the need to deal with past abuses through formal and informal mechanisms for resolving grievances arising from conflict and to create an impartial
and accountable legal system for the future" and arguing that this serves as one "pillar" of
post-conflict reconstruction).
22. See CRYER ET AL., supra note 1, at 24-25; Jane E. Stromseth, PursuingAccountability
for Atrocities After Conflict: What Impact on Building the Rule of Law, 38 GEO. J. INT'L L. 251,
251-56 (2007) ("[E]nsuring that perpetrators of atrocities face some reckoning can be
critical to moving forward on both an individual and community level in societies recovering from violent conflict. Ensuring some measure of accountability may help victims come
to terms with the past."); Press Release, Office of the High Representative, Bas-Backer:
Reconciliation Indispensable for Post-War Recovery (Oct. 27, 2006), available at http://
www.ohr.int/print/?content-id=38368 ("Justice, Truth, Peace and Forgiveness are four elements in a reconciliation process that is indispensable for post-war recovery.").
23. See, e.g., Payam Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentaiy on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 737, 774 (1998) ("[B]y
exposing the truth before an official and impartial public forum, the ICTY can contribute
significantly to altering power realities that are vestiges of indoctrination and misinformation to ethnic hatred and violence. But the ICTY can only be effective if it can establish
facts, bard and inescapable facts, with a moral or interpretive narrative based on elementary humanitarian values, which can become part of a shared truth for all peoples in the
former Yugoslavia. Even if it were possible, it is not necessary to establish an official and
exhaustive historical record for all times in order to bring about reconciliation. With the
world community as witness, the unifying power of truth telling can help heal the wounds,
exorcise the specters of the past, and build a solid moral foundation for future
generations.").
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mation is made available. 24 Thus, when judgment is rendered after
a procedurally fair trial, it exercises a special effect, undermining
or displacing other merely partisan views. As more and more discursive space is occupied by views that more and more members of
the society accept, the shared understandings essential to peaceful
co-existence are restored. 25 This is a claim about a causal chain,
and the chain originates in the trial process and its judgment.
The authoritative narrative theory has functional and genealogical roots in the common law and its adversarial process. While one
might suppose that the civil law would be more amenable to the
construction of authoritative narratives-after all, the civil law traditionally aspires to establish the truth, where the common law is
content with the more pragmatic goal of a verdict 26 -the common
law's historical dominance in constructing ICL 2 7 has inflected the
authoritative narrative theory with its adversarial values and process, its expectation of partisan clashes mediated, and ultimately

24. This is similar to what Stanley Hoffman called law's "distinct solemnity of effects."
Stanley Hoffmann, The Study of InternationalLaw and the Theory of InternationalRelations, 57
PROc. Am.Soc'Y Irr'LL. 26, 34 (1963). Solemn or not, the coercive powers of a court are
themselves exercised in a world of politics, and are generally reliant on state cooperation.
See VICTOR PESKIN, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE IN RWANDA AND THE BALKANS: VIRTUAL TIALS
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR STATE COOPERATION

(2008).

25. Cf The Hague Tribunal and Balkan Reconciliation, supra note 1 (noting Pierre
Hazan's commentary that criminal courts make it possible to "narrow the scope of permissible lies ....If you can do that, maybe you can have different memories which can coexist
peacefully .... And if you reach that point, even before reaching some kind of long-term
common narrative, that's something significant.").
26. See Mirjan Damagka, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal
Procedure:A ComparativeStudy, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 506, 581 (1973) ("It is openly stated by
some common law lawyers that the aim of criminal procedure is not so much the ascertainment of the real truth as the just settlement of a dispute.... In talking about ends of the
criminal process continental lawyers place a primary emphasis on the discovery of the truth
as a prerequisite to a just decision.").
27. See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl, Toward a Criminology ofInternationalCrime, 19 OHIO ST. J.
ON Disp. RESOL. 263, 272 (2003) ("Anglo-American common law approaches exert a somewhat disproportionate influence in the structure and functioning of international criminal
law and adjudication."); cf. CRYER ET AL., supra note 1, at 351-52 (noting that as initially
adopted "the ICTY procedures were mainly adversarial in nature," but acknowledging that
"[m]any of the amendments have been in an inquisitorial direction, inter alia increasing
the judges' controlling powers"); Daryl A. Mundis, From 'Common Law' Towards 'Civil Law'.
The Evolution of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 14 LEIDEN J. INT'L. L. 367, 368
("While the first few trials at the Tribunal closely resembled common law criminal trials,
the level of control being exercised by the Trial Chambers in recent cases is moving more
in the direction of the civil law approach."). The International Criminal Court exhibits
much less common law influence, however, and this merely genealogical influence is not
determinative; there is no reason to think that the authoritative narrative theory operates
exclusively in a common law environment.
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resolved, by a neutral judge. 28 (We will return to this feature in
Part III.)
Surely no scholar or practitioner thinks that a trial's only purpose
is narrative, but for those who accept the authoritative narrative
theory in some form, the creation of definitive narratives is one
central purpose of having trials. 29 Moreover, this understanding of
the theory intersects with claims about a 'right to truth' 3 0-itself
part of a broader secular process of convergence between ICL,
human rights, and humanitarian law, as well as the related judicialization of international relations. 3' From this perspective, the
expansive strategy of the Milosevic prosecution was a laudable effort
to tell the story of the entire Yugoslav crisis through the prism of
Milogevic's plan for a Greater Serbia. 32 These narratives are not
identical to the writing of history, nor to a search for the truth, but

28. CRYER ET AL., supra note 1, at 350 (describing the role of the judge in the common
law system as "traditionally" like "a referee").
29. See, e.g., Yasmin Naqvi, The Right to the Truth in InternationalLaw: Fact or Fiction, 88
INT'L REV. RED CROSS 245, 246 (2006) (discussing the traditionally limited role of the truth
in domestic criminal law and its far broader purpose in ICL, and noting that "the unique
objectives that international criminal law is supposed to fulfill .. . range from such lofty
goals as contributing to 'the restoration and maintenance of peace' and 'the process of
national reconciliation' to . . .reconstructing national identities from interpretations of
the past through criminal legal analysis and process, and setting down a historical record
with a legal imprint"); see also Daniel Joyce, The HistoricalFunction of International Criminal
Trials: Re-thinking International Criminal Law, 73 NoRDic J. INT'L L. 461, 462-63 (2004);
Richard Ashby Wilson,JudgingHistory: The HistoricalRecord of the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 908, 917-18 (2005).
30. Naqvi, supra note 29, at 248 (discussing the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
Resolution 2005/66, which "[r]ecognizes the importance of respecting and ensuring the
right to the truth so as to contribute to ending impunity and to promote and protect
human rights").
31. See, e.g., CRYER ET AL., supra note 1, at 9-11 (discussing the relationship and reliance of ICL on human rights and humanitarian law); Ran Hirschl, The New Constitutionalism and the Judicializationof Pure Politics Worldwide, 75 FoRDHAM L. REv. 721, 722 (2006)
(describing the turn to legal discourse and judiciaries for broad questions of public policy
and traditionally political issues, especially through international tribunals). Logically, it is
possible to accept the value of trials in producing accepted truths without concluding that
this necessarily has any reconciliatory effect; this describes an interim, moderate version of
the authoritative narrative theory, though one with its own controversies about the nature
and social acceptance of truth.
32. See, e.g., ARMA-rrA, supra note 5, at 4-6; Wilson, supra note 29, at 918 (noting the
larger historical questions in the Milogevi6 trial that "the ICTY ha[d] no choice but to
decide"). The Prosecution's approach was also a consequence of its charging strategy - its
need to prove special intent for genocide - and its decision to seek joinder of the three
indictments, which required a common plan. See discussion accompanying notes 89-91,
infra.
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contribute to those processes, creating a social consensus in which
33
history-writing and shared understanding are possible.
The hard, optimistic edge of this view-that trials are or should
be principally about generating transformative narratives, and are
particularly good at it-has receded in recent years.3 4 To retrench,
however, is not to abandon, and even as scholars and practitioners
sophisticate their claims, they have preserved an important role for
narrative.3 5 Individual trials may not create undeniable truths
about conflicts, but they introduce and vet evidence that can serve
as baselines to counter specific denialist accounts, and establish
facts and contexts necessary to a broader narrative. For example,
adjudicating the mental state of defendants or deploying a theory
like joint criminal enterprise (JCE) implicitly requires a court to
say something about social contexts and war aims.3 6 Moreover, the
tribunal's jurisprudence as a whole provides broader narrative
33. See Lawrence Douglas, History and Memory in the Courtroom: Reflections on Perpetrator
Trials, in THE NUREMBERG TRtALS: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW SINCE 1945, at 95, 96 (Herbert R. Reginbogin & Christoph J.M. Safferling eds., 2006) ("Trials ... particularly those
burdened with the legacy of traumatic history, often succeed at shaping the terms of collec-

tive memory precisely by demonstrating-intentionally or not-a relaxed fidelity to the
historical record."). This perspective has been applied to ICTY trials as well. See Wilson,
supra note 29, at 922-42 (describing the Tadie and Krstiejudgments as extensive narratives
of the Yugoslav conflict).
34. See, e.g., Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Defense Perspectives on Law and Politics in International Criminal Trials, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 529, 532 (2008) ("[T]he recent drive of the ICTY
and ICTR toward completion of their proceedings has pushed the proceedings further
away from some of their original political purposes and toward the adjudicative model.");
cf ARMATrA, supra note 5, at xi, 1 (noting that "[t]he [Miloevi] trial was about one person.
It did not and could not provide a complete historical record or a full accounting of all
people who perpetrated war crimes," but also criticizing the ICTY for allowing Milogevie to
"further the 'myth of Milosevic'" concerning Serb victimhood).
35. See Wilson, supra note 29, at 917-18. See generally Joyce, supra note 29 (assessing
the narrative role of trials and their limits through a study of Philip Allott, Hannah Arendt,
and Martha Minow's works, and proposing further recognition of the historical function of
these trials).

36. See Prosecutor v. Delalit, Case No. IT-96-21, Judgement,
196-220 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999); MICHAEL P. SCHAR, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE
STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG 215 (1997).
Joint criminal enterprise (JCE) is a theory of liability describing participation in a common
plan or purpose that is itself criminal, or includes criminal acts. There are three types: type
I, in which individuals share a specific criminal intent, like a murder; type II "systems of illtreatment," such as concentration camps; and type III or theaterJCE, in which individuals
are liable for the "natural and foreseeable consequence of effecting [the] common purpose," such as ethnically cleansing a region. Types II and III require evidence of the scale
and consequences of the system or campaign. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment, ICTY
Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 1 195-204 (July 15, 1999); Alison Marston Danner
andJenny S. Martinez, Guilty Association:JointCriminalEnterprise, Command Responsibility and
the Development of International CriminalLaw, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 102-10 (2005).
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authority than any one trial. 37 From this perspective, the Miloevic
prosecution's broad framing might not have produced a dispositive
narrative on its own, but it could have contributed to one, and
38
could still.
B.

Skepticism-The Theory's Critics

Equally, other observers question the claim that judgments catalyze the creation of authoritative, transformative narratives. 39 For
these critics, courts' technical procedures and their focus on spe40
cific legal questions make them ill-equipped to write histories.
The fiction of combat between competing narratives balanced by a
neutral judge who then arrives at a fuller truth strains credulity.
The extraordinary imbalance in resources between any given inter41
national prosecution and any given defense team is well known;
37.

See DIANE F. ORENTLICHER, SHRINKING THE SPACE FOR DENIAL: THE IMPACT OF THE

ICTY IN SERBIA 73 (2008), available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/internationalQjustice/articles-publications/publications/serbia_20080520/serbia_20080501.
pdf (suggesting that other trials in the "The Hague may result in judgments that achieve
some of the results expected in the Milogevie case, shedding light on the relationship
between Belgrade and Serb forces operating in Bosnia and Croatia").
38. Other trials at the ICTY have considered parts of the same crime base that underlay Milogevic, and judgments in some of those cases have discussed Milogevic's own role.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milutinovit, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Judgement (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2009). Something similar may well occur in the trial of
Radovan Karadzic or, eventually, of Ratko Mladic.
39. See, e.g., Helena Cobban, InternationalCourts, FOREIGN POL'Y, Mar.-Apr. 2006, at 22,
22-28 (questioning the contribution of ICL to peace and human rights or the demand for
criminal process from victims). These views have a considerable pedigree. See HANNAH
ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 233 (1964)

(sug-

gesting that courts should not try to undertake historical interpretations of conflicts' origins);

CLIFFORD

GEERTz,

LOCAL

KNOWLEDGE:

FURTHER

ESSAYS

IN

INTERPRETATIVE

ANTHROPOLOGY 173 (1983) ("[W]hatever it is that the law is after it is not the whole
story.").
40.

See MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIvE MEMORY, AND THE LAW 79-94 (1997).

Wilson, though ultimately favoring a history-writing role for courts, ably explicates the
main arguments of "the long-held assumption in socio-legal scholarship that courts are
inappropriate venues to construct wide-ranging historical explanations of past conflicts."
See Wilson, supra note 29, at 909. He describes these arguments as "Incompatibility" (law
and history have distinctive processes and epistemologies), "Partiality" ("courts are too
selective and limited in scope to reveal the 'whole story'"), and the critique that "law produces Boring History" (law displays a technical approach and "tiresome proceduralism"). Id.
at 912-16; cf Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 MAX PLANCK Y.B.
UNITED NATIONS. L. 1, 11-19 (2002) (opposing legal truth, with its individual focus, to

historical truth, with its contextual focus).
41. See Prosecutor v. Tadit, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement,

29-56 (Int'l Crim.

Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (addressing the issue of imbalance, but

concluding that "the Appellant has failed to show that the protection offered by the principle of equality of arms was not extended to him by the Trial Chamber"); BOAS, supra note
14, at 32-43 ("[It is obvious that the resources at the disposal of the prosecution in any
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for self-representing defendants such as Milogevic, it evidently can
reach to the limits of physical endurance. 42
Furthermore, true justice requires a neutral, or at least non-partisan, position in the contestation of histories and nationalist perspectives, 4 3 but the neutrality of the court and its officers is often
purchased through an almost total abstraction from and ignorance
of the local communities whose conflicts the court must adjudicate. 44 Indeed, for the theory's critics, it is not clear that there is a
simultaneously neutral and informed position: the questions most
critical to those for whom an authoritative narrative is most
needed-the citizens of the former conflict zone-are often of a
nature and complexity that will escape a neutral outsider.
These problems are magnified by the adversarial nature of international criminal law. In its domestic incarnations, the adversarial
trial system has been conceptually content with verdicts rather than
truth; the ambitious grafting of the further, higher goal of truthincontestable, undeniable, and displacing truth-onto the
mechanics of adversarial trials overreaches. These imbalances and
defects undermine the very idea that international courts produce
proceedings before the ICTY is substantially greater than that available to the accused ....
[T] he quantity of defence funding to service trials of high-level officials, when compared
with the resources expended on those cases by the Office of the Prosecutor, may be considerably unbalanced."); James Cockayne, The FrayingShoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes
Tribunals,28 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 616, 669-74 (2005) (stressing that the recurrent problem
of inequality of arms persists in the Special Court for Sierra Leone because of disproportionate allocation of resources and structural design flaws). But see Prosecutor v. Delalid,
Case No. IT-96-21, Decision on the Prosecution's Motion for an Order Requiring Advance
Disclosure of Witnesses by the Defence,
44-49 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 4, 1998) (ordering the Defense to supply the Prosecution with a list of witnesses
on a theory of equality of arms).
42. See BOAS, supra note 14, at 265-70; PATRICIA M. WALD, TYRANTS ON TRILk: KEEPING
ORDER IN THE COURTROOM 40-42 (2009); Michael P. Scharf, Self-Representation Versus Assign-

ment of Defence CounselBefore InternationalCriminalTribunals,4J. INT'L CRiM. JusT. 31, 38-40
(2006) (arguing for the imposition of a counsel because of the complexity of international
crimes cases).
43. Wilson notes Arendt's argument that "overbearing pressures to construct a nationalist narrative in the courtroom had detracted from the pursuit of justice and violated
principles of due process." Wilson, supra note 29, at 911.
44. See, e.g., Elena Baylis, Tribunal-Happingwith the Post-ConflictJustice Junkies, 10 OR.
REV. INT'L L. 361, 365 (2008); The Hague Tribunal and Balkan Reconciliation, supra note 1
(noting that "it is clear that whatever chance the ICTY had to contribute to the complex
process of reconciliation was for a long time compromised by its failure to engage with
people in the region"). For a powerful empirical critique of the ways in which international tribunals generate unreliable witness testimony, in part because the process is unresponsive to cultural differences, see NANCY COMBS, FAcT-FINDING wrrHOUT FACTS: THE
UNCERTAIN EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS (2010).
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sufficiently balanced and deliberate outcomes to merit authoritative respect in the first place.
Apart from these process-based or normative concerns, the
authoritative narrative theory also faces an empirical challengeone that also questions broader claims about post-conflict transformation through law: Quite apart from whether international courts
can construct informed, neutral narratives, can the narratives they
do construct actually do what the theory supposes, which is contribute to reconciliation? Of course this is a methodologically fraught
proposition - how could one possibly prove, definitively, the particular effect of this one variable amid the complexity of a society in
transition? Yet although certainty is impossible, the imperfect evidence we do have does not appear to support the strongest claims
of the theory: In the former Yugoslavia, there is little evidence that
fifteen years of judgments from the ICTY have changed the minds
of people divided by violent conflict or demonstrably moved individuals in the different successor states towards a common vision of
the conflict, or even a shared understanding of their roles in

45

it.

Early enthusiasms for international tribunals as agents of reconciliation have become subdued in the absence of any evidence that
reconciliation is occurring in the former Yugoslavia, let alone that
the ICTY has contributed to

46
it.

The recent turn to expressive the-

SeeJohn B. Allcock, The InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, in
346, 380 (Charles Ingrao & Thomas A.
Emmert eds., 2009) (investigating local perceptions of the Tribunal and concluding that
"[a]spirations that it might provide anything like a complete account of the experience of
war have not been met - and for pragmatic reasons, cannot be. The hope that it might
promote reconciliation between the peoples of the regions does not appear to have been
realized. Reconciliation, if it is to be achieved, is an immense task that will clearly require
more than judicial intervention and will extend well beyond the lifetime of the ICTY.").
46. See, e.g., INT'L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER YUGosAvIA, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT ON THE CONFERENCE ASSESSING THE LEGACY OF THE ICTY 1-2 (2010) ("It was widely
agreed upon that the ICTY had made a tremendous contribution to bringing justice to the
affected populations in the former Yugoslavia, but the communities have not yet reconciled and this is not something that could be achieved by the Tribunal alone."); Janine
Natalya Clark, Judging the ICTY: Has it Achieved its Objectives?, 9 SOUTHEAST EUR. & BLACK
SEA STUD. 123, 134-36 (2009) (acknowledging the lack of ICTY's contribution to reconciliation); The Hague Tribunaland Balkan Reconciliation, supra note 1 (discussing lack of reconciliation in Bosnia and finding an "incredibly complex state of affairs in which convenient
assumptions about justice, truth and reconciliation quickly dissolve. Our findings suggest
that if the ICTY is able to play any role in fostering reconciliation in the Balkans, it can only
do so within the context of an intricate web of interlinked factors which could take decades
to unravel. At the heart of the problem lies an intense resistance by many in the region to
the reality that their own ethnic kin committed atrocities."). This latter report also cites
Professor Steven Burg as commenting: "As a social phenomenon I certainly do not think
[the ICTY is] working .... There's no evidence in the political behaviours-in the voting
patterns, in the way local governments function or don't function-that reconciliation has
45.

CONFRONTING THE YUGOSLAV CONTROVERSIES
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ories to justify ICL is, in part, a recognition that both deterrence
and reconciliation rest on an empirically weak base. 47 In the
Balkans and elsewhere, it is simply not necessarily true that single
48
narratives win out after conflict.
For these skeptics, the Milo~evic prosecution's strategy was a
sprawling overreach that lost sight of the core purposes of having a
trial and succumbed to the lure of a broader narrative of victimhood. 49 These skeptics would prefer a narrower forensic trial
paradigm in which such aspirations are rigorously excluded from
consideration in designing and managing trials. 50 At most, a forensic trial might contribute indirectly to historians' construction of
narratives, but the court's own judgment will have little value, even
in this indirect way, if its process has not rigorously excluded the
ambitious goals that proponents of the authoritative narrative theory advocate for trials.

happened anywhere." Id. But see LARA J. NETELFIELD, COURTING DEMOCRACY IN BOSNIA
THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL'S IMPACT IN A POSTWAR STATE 3 (2010) (examining the ICTY's positive impact on Bosnia's democratic transition); ORENTLICHER, supra
note 1, at 39-44, 105-06 (discussing some of the effects of the ICTYs reconciliation and
truth-telling work in Bosnia).
47. See Immi Tallgren, The Sensibility and Sense of InternationalCriminalLaw, 13 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 561, 590 (2002) ("Everybody knows that prevention does not work ....
"); David
Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of InternationalJustice, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
473, 474 (1999) ("Unfortunately, the connection between international prosecutions and
the actual deterrence of future atrocities is at best a plausible but largely untested assumption."). See generally Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of InternationalPunishment: The
Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of InternationalCriminal Law, 43 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 39 (2007) (reviewing various rationales for punishment and preferring expressive
theories). On expressivism, see generally MARK DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 173-80 (2007).
48. See GerryJ. Simpson, Didactic and DissidentHistories in War Crimes Trials, 60 ALB. L.
REV. 801, 833-36 (1997) (recognizing the existence of dissident narratives). Bogdan
Ivanisevic, The Milosevic Trial is Doing Its Job, HUM. RTs. WATCH (Aug. 30, 2004), http://
www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/08/30/milosevic-trial-doing-its-job ("The Hague tribunal has
not altered this mentality of collective denial [among Serbs about the crimes committed in
the conflict]. Nor can it be expected to; that change must come from Serbia itself.").
49. See Gideon Boas & Timothy L.H. McCormack, Learning the Lessons of the Milogevie
Tria4 9 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 65, 73-74 (2006) ("Throughout the Milogevie trial proceedings the Prosecution persistently proclaimed its responsibility to all the victims of the
three theatres of conflict .... Laudable though such a sentiment may be, it was impossible
to satisfy the legitimate needs, interests and concerns of all the victims of all three Balkan
conflicts over eight years, particularly in the context of a single criminal trial against one
accused. The Prosecution's specific allegations against Milogevit reflect a commitment to
include reference to as many municipalities as possible.").
50. See BoAs, supranote 14, at 133-38; OSIEL, supra note 40, at 90; Ruti Teitel, Bringing
the Messiah Through the Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS: GETTYSBURG To
BOSNIA 177, 182-83 (Carla Hesse and Robert Post eds., 1999).
AND HERZEGOVINA:

A Kind of Judgment

2010]

C.

The Special Problem of Death

It is not necessary to decide between these two general views,
however, because from either perspective, there will be a problem
with a terminated trial's contribution to the construction of narratives. The latter view is skeptical about any judgment's ability to
transform societies; 5 ' but even though the former view is considerably more enthusiastic, 52 the weakest link in its argument turns out
to be the first one: the existence of a judgment. For, at rates that
would constitute a national scandal in a domestic jurisdiction,
defendants in international criminal processes die. Out of the 161
individuals indicted at the ICTY, sixteen have died before completion, or even initiation, of their trials 53-a mortality rate just under
10 percent. Some tribunals with smaller dockets have had even
higher death rates: Two of the Special Court for Sierra Leone's
thirteen indictments have been withdrawn due to death, 54 and the
International Criminal Court's record to date is only slightly better. 55 Other tribunals have had less dramatic rates, but still con51. See Marko Attila Hoare, Bosnia-Hercegovina and InternationalJustice:Past Failuresand
Future Solutions, 24 E. EUR. POL. & Soc'v 191, 203 (2010) ("[T]here is no evidence to suggest that the ICTY - with no prior allocation of guilt to one side in the war, by treating war
crimes on a purely individual basis, and by lumping together war criminals from all sideshas made any contribution to reconciliation between the former Yugoslavs. On the contrary; unlike after World War II, the international community has failed to impose a narrative of who was to blame for the War of Yugoslav Succession and to force each side to
accept it. Consequently, each side continues to see itself as the victim in the conflict and to
see the tribunal's record purely in terms of how too many of its own people and/or too few
of the other sides' have been indicted, or how the other sides' indictees have been wrongfully acquitted or received too short sentences.").
52. See, e.g., SCHARF, supra note 36, at 215 ("The record of the [ Tadi] trial provides an
authoritative and impartial account to which future historians may turn for the truth, and
future leaders for warning. While there are various means to achieve an historic record of
abuses after a war, the most authoritative rendering is possible only through the crucible of
a trial that accords full due process.").
53. See Key Figures, INT'L CRiM. TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER YUGosLAVIA, http://www.icty.
org/sections/TheCases/KeyFigures (last updated Mar. 28, 2011). Ten died before they
could be transferred, while six died during their trials. Id.
54. About the Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, SPECIAL CT. FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://WWW.
sc-sl.org/ABOUT/tabid/70/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 3, 2011).
55. Two of the seventeen individuals indicted by the International Criminal Court are
already dead. See Situations and Cases, INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/
Situations+and+Cases/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2011) (noting the death of Raska Lukwiya).
Vincent Otti, also indicted as part of the situation in Uganda, is dead, although the ICC
still lists him as at large. See Noel Mwakugu, Obituary: LRA deputy Vincent Otti, BBC NEWS,
(Jan. 23, 2008), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7083311.stm (last visited
May 8, 2011); Wanted by the ICC, ENOUGH PROJECT, http://www.enoughproject.org/files/
pdf/lrajleaders.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2011).
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front this problem. 56 Efforts to try crimes in municipal courts
under international standards confront similar problems owing to
the antiquity of the underlying events, 57 or even because death
need not be only accidental, but can be strategic. 58
When defendants die, trials stop. Because there are no mechanisms for rendering judgment post mortem or contra mortuum, 59 the
trial simply ends, no outcome issues, and therefore, by the selfsame
logic of the authoritative narrative theory, because the first critical
link in the chain is never forged, the subsequent links never are
60
either.
Nor is the problem only implicated by actual physical death: trials that are terminated on technical or procedural groundsreally, any trial that, for whatever reason, ends without a full evaluation of the substantive evidence according to legal standardsshould fail to produce the kind of judgment the theory requires. 61
56.

Two of eighty-two defendants before the ICTR have died prior to completing trial.

See Cases: Status of Detainees, INT'L CRM. TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, http://www.unictr.org/

tabid/173/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 3, 2011). None of the five persons indicted by
the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia have died, but only one has been
convicted, and in Case 2, which is due to begin soon, the four defendants are in their late
seventies and eighties. See Seth Mydans, Anger in Cambodia Over Khmer Rouge Sentence, N.Y.
TIMES, July 26, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/27/world/asia/27cambodia.html
?th&emc=th.
57. Bangladesh, for example, has recently announced proceedings against individuals
involved in the violent events of independence from Pakistan in 1971. See David Manes,
Bangladesh Establishes Tribunalfor 1971 War Crimes, JURIST, Mar. 26, 2010, http://jurist.law.
pitt.edu/paperchase/2010/03/bangladesh-establishes-tribunal-for.php. Recent proposals
in Spain and Argentina to investigate crimes in the Spanish Civil War would result in
indictment of individuals, the youngest of whom-assuming they had reached the age of
majority when the war ended-would now be eighty-nine years old. See David Manes,
Argentine Prosecutor Recommends Dropping Spanish War Crimes Cases, JURIST, May 2, 2010,
http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010 05/argentina-prosecutor-recommends-dropping-spanish-war-crimes-cases.php.
58. Saddam Hussein was executed following trial on a limited set of charges (pertaining to one massacre of 148 individuals in Dujail in 1982), before he could be tried a much
larger array of charges that would have been critical to any attempt to use the trial process
to construct a narrative of his rule. See Iraq court drops Saddam's charges, NEWS (BBC, Jan. 8,
2007), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/6239853.stm. Thanks to Prof.
Mark Drumbl for this point.
59. Systems that tolerate trial in absentia should, in theory, have no objection to the
idea, but this is not an option at the tribunals.
60. See ORENTLICHER, supra note 37, at 80 (quoting the opinion of one pollster:
"Because of Milogevit's death, his trial did not have a 'wow effect.' He's dead, and he was
not guilty. Had he been found guilty, we'd be able to get rid of this bad stuff and move
toward cooperation with the European Union.").
61. Such terminations have been relatively rare, but have occurred, or nearly
occurred, in prominent cases, such as Barayagwizaat the ICTR and, more recently Lubanga
at the International Criminal Court. See PESKIN, supra note 24, 177-82 (discussing the
acquittal of Barayagwiza on human rights grounds and subsequent reinstatement of the
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Whether from death or any other cause, the termination of a trial
is an "[i]nterrupted [p]erformance[ ]," whose narrative is
62
incomplete.
Trials are not only about narrative; many other goals have been
63
advanced and even preferred for holding international trials.
The creation of narrative, however, has assuredly been one of the
principal goals for many advocates and theorists, and whatever else
trials may do, here we consider how that goal is affected by premature termination. Similarly, a final judgment is not the only part of
a trial that has any value; other effects manifest themselves
throughout the trial process. Certainly, the residuum of a terminated trial has uses-the accumulated transcripts, exhibits, briefs,
orders, and interim decisions constitute an archive with a meticu64
lously documented provenance that any historian would value. It
seems undeniable that other acts and images in a trial-confession
in open court, a shocking film-can come to have an iconic or
emotive value greater, in their way, than formal authority. 65 More
case against him); Cases & Situations:Lubanga Case, COALITION FOR INT'L CRIM. CT., http://
www.iccnow.org/?mod=drctimelinelubanga (last visited Apr. 3, 2011) (discussing nearrelease of Lubanga due to abuses of the trial process).
62. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, supra note 47, at 177 ("Milogevic's premature death is an
obstacle to the ICTY's narration of an overarching story of death and destruction in the
Balkans.").
63.

See, e.g., M. CHERIF BAssiOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

737-40 (2003) (listing prevention, enhancement of peace, providing victims with redress
and remembrance); CRYER ET AL., supra note 1, at 18-25 (defining the aims of ICL to
include goals of punishment, such as retribution, deterrence, denunciation, education,
incapacitation and rehabilitation, but also justice for victims, recording history, and postconflict reconciliation). Pursuit of justice-whether for its own sake or for instrumental
purposes-is surely the most commonly proffered rationale. See, e.g., Ivanisevic, supra note
48 (stating that the Hague "tribunal's main task is to provide justice for the victims and
their families in the former Yugoslavia. . . .

[U]ltimately its success will be judged by

whether it can deliver justice, not by how long that process takes or whether it affects
Serbia's politics.").
64.

See HUM. RTs. WATCH, THE BALKANS, WEIGHING THE EVIDENCE: LESSONS FROM THE

SLOBODAN MILOsEVIc TRIAL 14 (2006) ("Even though the lengthy trial process did not lead
to a verdict, the information introduced at trial was itself important. Future generations

will use the evidence to understand the region's history and how the conflicts came to
pass.").
65.

For example, Dra~en Erdemovic's apology and expression of remorse arguably

made a greater impression on the judges than is apparent from the more restrained text of
the judgment. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 1996). Similarly, the so-called Scorpions video - showing a massacre at Srebrenica - though not formally admitted into evidence, nonetheless had a powerful impact in the former Yugoslavia. (The video, however,
was found, not by the ICTY, but by a Serbian activist, who also sent it to Serbian television
stations; it is not clear, therefore, how much the ICTY's own deployment of the video
contributed to that effect.) See Daniel Williams, Srebrenica Video Vindicates Long Pursuit By
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generally, the trial process itself-hearings, procedures, evidencetaking, and testimony, indeed the very fact of a trial 66-may have
an influence on people in post-conflict societies who see the rule of
law as an alternative approach to social division taking shape. 6 7 As
Richard Holbrooke declared following Milogevic's death, "the trial
was the verdict.... The Serb people came to understand the truth
that he was not a nationalist, but an opportunist. A kind of rough
68
and imperfect justice was served."
Yet as valuable as these elements may be, they are structurally
secondary and second-best: Judgment has a hierarchically superior
role to these ancillary effects-most of whose purpose, really, is to
contribute to and demonstrate the integrity of judgment-and it is
hard to imagine a robust argument for holding a criminal trial if
one knew in advance that it would end without judgment. What
Holbrooke calls "rough and imperfect justice" is really the absence
of authority and its effect; indeed, he calls it that precisely to make
up for the evident fact that its authority is deficient. Thus, the particular problem posed by Miloevic is the lack of final authority and
the consequent search-at least by those convinced that judgment
matters-for an alternative. For some people, that search lighted
upon what looked like the nearest thing: the Trial Chamber's 2004
Decision on the Motion to Acquit.

Serb Activist, WASH. POST, June 25, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/24/AR2005062401501 .html.
66. See, e.g., The Death ofSlobodan Milosevic, TRANSITIONALJUST. FORUM (Mar. 11, 2006),
http://tj-forum.org/archives/001780.html ("Even without a final verdict against Milogevie,
the ICTY has contributed to transitional justice in Bosnia.... [T]he Tribunal was able to
secure the transfer of Milogevie and others to its custody for trial, thus piercing these former leaders' aura of invulnerability and permitting positive political change to begin in
Serbia & Montenegro.").
67. See, e.g., Chandra Lekha Sriram, Justice for Whom? Assessing Hybrid Approaches to
Accountability in Sierra Leone, in SECURITY, RECONSTRUCrION, AND RECONCILIATION: WHEN

THE WARs END 145, 147 (Muna Ndulo ed., 2007) ("[Plunishment may serve to restore or
install democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights by making it clear that law
proscribes certain actions and these actions are subject to punishment."). But see Jane
Stromseth, Justice on the Ground: Can internationalCriminal Courts Strengthen Domestic Rule of
Law in Post-ConflictSocieties?, 1 HAGUEJ. ON RULE OF L. 87, 88-89 (2009) (noting the limited
impact of international criminal tribunals on the rule of law in post conflict societies).
68. Marlise Simons & Gregory Crouch, Milosevic is Found Dead in Cell, U.N. Officials Say,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/12/international/europe/
12hague.html.
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II.

THE RULE 98Bis DECISION AND ITS CONTEXT

A.

The ICTY and the Miloevie Trial.69

The ICTY was founded in 1993 by the United Nations Security
Council, acting under its Chapter VII authority to take measures to
ensure "international peace and security." 70 From the beginning,
some observers have understood this use of the United Nations'
power to mean that the tribunal, though ajuridical institution, also
had an implicitly political function-a mandate to contribute both
to ending the ongoing wars in Bosnia and Croatia, and to eventual
71
post-war reconciliation.
Regardless, the ICTY was first and foremost a court, charged with
trying individuals accused of committing violations of recognized
international law in connection with the conflicts in the former
Yugoslavia. 72 The first international tribunal since Nuremberg, the
ICTYs Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence are
hybrids, but demonstrate considerable influence from the common law, adversarial model. 73 The ICTY prosecutor issued his first
69.

On the trial, see generally ARMATTA, supra note 5; BOAS, supra note 14; MICHAEL P.

SCHARF & WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC ON TiAL: A COMPANION (2002).

70. U.N. Charter art. 39 ("The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall . . .decide what
measures shall be taken .. .to maintain or restore international peace and security."); see
also id. art. 41 ("The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions.").
71. See Michael Humphrey, InternationalIntervention, Justice and NationalReconciliation:
The Role of the ICTY and ICTR in Bosnia and Rwanda, 2 J. HUM. RTs. 495, 496 (2003) ("The
fact that the life span of the ICTY is explicitly linked to the restoration of peace reflects this
wider role of international prosecutions. They are part of the institutionalizing strategies,
along with peace negotiations, democratic elections and truth commissions to promote
national reconstruction after mass atrocity."); see also ORENTrCHER, supra note 1, at 39
("The word 'reconciliation' is not used in the Security Council resolution establishing the
ICTY, nor is it included in the goals of the Tribunal set forth on its own Web site. Even so,
many have assumed that the Security Council's determination that creating the ICTY
would contribute to peace includes the notion of reconciliation-a view that has at times
been reflected in ICTYjudgments and reports.");,Press Release, Int'l Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, The ICTY and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Bosnia
and Herzegovina (May 17, 2001), available at http://www.icty.org/sid/7985 (referring to
the Tribunal's "mission of reconciliation"); The Hague Tribunal and Balkan Reconciliation,
supra note 1 ("[I]t has been widely hoped that the ICTY had a role to play beyond simply
dispensing criminal justice .... [O]ver the years, an expectation has persisted that the
ICTLYs work would or should help to reconcile the peoples of the Balkans with their violent
recent history, even if only as a by-product of its central, specifically judicial aims.").
72. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, art.
2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
73. See KNoops, supra note 2, at 6-9; Louise Arbour, The Status of the InternationalCriminal Tribunalsfor the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Goals and Results, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y
Symp. 37, 46 (1999) (stating that "the Tribunals are completely dominated by the AngloAmerican common law system"); Megan Fairlie, The Marriage of Common and Continental
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indictments in 1994, the first trial began in 1995, and soon many
74
more followed.
Slobodan Milogevic was already an established political leader
before any of this occurred, and even before the founding of the
tribunal, he and his government were the focus of war crimes accusations. 75 An apparatchik in the Serbian Communist Party in Tito's
Yugoslavia, Milogevic rose to the prominence in the late 1980s
amid economic crisis, rising nationalist sentiment, and political
paralysis.7 6 Depending on one's view, Milogevic was the political
beneficiary of this process, its principal instigator, or both. 77 By the
time Slovenia withdrew from Yugoslavia in mid-1991, Milogevic was
President of Serbia, the most powerful actor in Yugoslavia, and a
recognized leader of Serbs throughout the country. 78 Violent conflict broke out later that year over the withdrawal of Croatia, whose
large Serb minority resisted with support from Belgrade. 79 Bosnia's withdrawal, in early 1992, initiated another conflict, this time
80
with three-way fighting between Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats.
As the most powerful figure in the remainder of Yugoslavia,
Milogevic had considerable military and political resources at his
disposal to intervene in these conflicts, and his influence was
widely acknowledged. 8' Throughout this period, there were calls
Law at the ICTY and its Progeny, Due ProcessDeficit, 4 INT'L CPuM. L. REv. 243, 268-70 (2004)
(providing that the Statute of the ICTY adopted an adversarial structure).
74.

See About the ICTY: Timeline, INT'L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http:/

/www.icty.org/action/timeline/254

(last visited Apr. 3, 2011).

75. See Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Path to the Hague: Selected
Documents on the Origins of the ICTY 55 (1996) (providing text of Eagleburger's speech);
RACHEL KERR, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: AN
EXERCISE IN LAW, POLITICS AND DIPLOMAcY 35 (2004) (discussing U.S. Secretary of State

Lawrence Eagleburger's December 1992 "'naming names speech' in which he announced
that the United States had identified ten suspected war criminals who should be prosecuted, including Milogevit").
76. SCrIARF & SCHABAS, supra note 69, at 9-12.
77. Id. (suggesting that Milogevit and his wife may have orchestrated the principal
incident that transformed him into a Serb national hero).
78.
79.
80.
sLAViA:

Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 18-20.
For a description of the conflicts, see generally MisHA GLENNY, THE FALL OF YUGOTHE THIRD BALKAN WAR (1994); LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LITTLE, YUGOSLAVIA: DEATH

OF A NATION (1997).

81.

See, e.g., Stuart J. Kaufman, An 'International'Theory of Inter-Ethnic War, 22 REV.

INT'L STUD. 149, 159-62 (1996) (describing the conflicts as elite-led violence with Milogevit
as a central player). See generally Agneza BoZic-Roberson, Words Before the War: Milosevic's Use

of Mass Media and Rhetoric to Provoke EthnopoliticalConflict in Former Yugoslavia, 38 E. EUR.
395 (2004) (analyzing MilogeviCs central role in these conflicts through his rhetoric).
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for his prosecution, 82 but the ICTY prosecutor only issued an
indictment in May 1999 and at first, only for events in Kosovo,
where hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians were expelled
and NATO forces had intervened.8 3 Milogevic stayed in power
until late 2000, when he was forced to concede defeat in an election and was transferred, in mid-2001, to The Hague.8 4 Indictments for crimes in Croatia and Bosnia were added. 85 In all,
Milogevic was charged with sixty-six counts of war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and, for Bosnia, genocide. 8 6 Moreover, underly87
ing these counts were thousands of individual allegations.
Milogevic was charged on theories of direct and command responsibility, 8 8 each of which required proving his relationship to chains
of command for the armed forces, police, and paramilitaries doing
the actual killing.
Shortly before trial began, the prosecutor joined the three
indictments. 89 The theory by which the prosecution successfully
argued forjoinder was that Milogevic and others were involved in a
single "transaction" of alleged crimes in three conflicts and three
countries spanning eight years-an overarching JCE whose members sought to create a "Greater Serbia" through the violent expulsion of non-Serbs. 90 The prosecution therefore promised not only
to demonstrate Milogevic's guilt, but to do so in a way that showed
the complicity of the senior leadership of Serbia, the Republika
Srpska in Bosnia, and the Serbian Republic of the Krajina in Croatia. 91 The prosecution's theory, implicitly, sought to explain the
82. See PAUL WILLIAMS & NORMAN CIGAR, WAR CRIMES AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY.
A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR THE INDICTMENT OF SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 1 (1996).
83. See Prosecutor v. Milogevi6, Case No. IT-99-37, Indictment, 1 90-100 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 22, 1999), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
slobodanmilosevic/ind/en/mil-ii990524e.htm. On Kosovo, see generally TIM JUDAH,

Kosovo:

WAR AND REVENGE

(2000).

84. ScHA.ir & SCHABAS, supra note 69, at 35-38.
85. Id. at 38.
86. BoAS, supra note 14, at 1.
87. Id.
88. See Milofevi, Indictment
5-28, 29-33 (listing MilogeviCs responsibility under
articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the ICTY statute).
89. Prosecutor v. Milogevie, Case Nos. IT-99-37-PT, IT-01-50-PT & IT-01-51-PT, Decision on Prosecution's Motion forJoinder,
2, 16 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 13, 2001), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan-milosevic/tdec/
en/11213JD516912.htm.
90. Id. 16. Rule 49 stipulates that "[t]wo or more crimes may be joined in one
indictment if the series of acts committed together form the same transaction, and the said
crimes were committed by the same accused." See ICTY R. P. & EVID. 49.
91. BOAS, supra note 14, at 80-92 (discussing the content and scope of the
indictments).
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origins and course of the entire conflict-an ambitious goal, but
one perfectly fit to the creation of a powerful, comprehensive narrative that might, in turn, be used to transform whole societies.
The trial began in 2002. Over the next four years, an enormous
documentary record was produced-over 1.2 million pages of documentation, hundreds of witnesses, and tens of thousands of pages
of transcripts. 92 Throughout the trial, Milogevic denied the legitimacy of the tribunal and refused counsel, although he took an
active role in the proceedings, cross-examining witnesses and arguing points. 9 3 Milogevic's decision to represent himself became one
of the defining features of the trial, providing him with a very public platform to advance his own interpretation of Yugoslavia's conflicts, provoking several showdowns with the chamber, and adding
considerably to the length of an already sprawling trial. 94 Because
he was not represented by counsel despite the enormous burdens
of case preparation, the chamber appointed amici curiae to assist
him; 95 their tasks included raising certain motions, including filing
96
a motion of acquittal at the end of the prosecution phase.
92.
93.

Id. at xii-xiii.
Id. at 10-12.

94. See WALD, supra note 42, at 51-54 (discussing the obstacles raised by Milogevi4's
self-representation); David Scheffer, The Hague War Crimes Tribunal: Enough of Milosevic's
Antics, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2O04/07/13/opinion/13ihtedscheffer ed3_.html. But see Prosecutor v. Milogevit, Case No. IT-02-54, Reasons for Decision on the Prosecution Motion Concerning Assignment of Counsel, 11 1, 20, 39, 41 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 4, 2003) (rejecting the prosecution motion to
impose defense counsel because of the adversarial character of the proceedings and the
existence of a right to defense oneself, and noting Milogevit's competence, health and
conduct did not preclude a fair and expeditious trial). The prosecution made further
requests that the chamber impose counsel. See, e.g., Prosecution Motion for a Hearing to
Discuss the Implications of the Accused's Recurring Ill Health 1 8, Prosecutor v. Milogevie,
Case No. IT-02-54-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 23, 2003). In part,
this was out of fair trial concerns, but it was also because MilogeviCs self-representation
provided him with a highly effective public platform.
95. Three amici were appointed by the Registrar on September 6, 2001. Prosecutor v.
Milogevit, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel,
4 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 22, 2004), availableat http://www.icty.
org/x/cases/slobodan-milosevic/tdec/en/040922.htm. In late 2004, when the defense
phase began (shortly after the Decision this Article discusses was issued), the chamber
imposed counsel on Milogevit, appointing the same lawyers who had previously served as
amici. See generally id. (setting out the reasons for the September 2, 2004 oral ruling imposing counsel).
96. Following a request for clarification by the amici--in essence, a request from
them-the chamber ruled that the amici could pursue the motion. Prosecutor v. Milogevit,
Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order on Amici Curiae Request Concerning the Manner of their
Future Engagement and Procedural Directions under Rule 98bis, at 2 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia June 27, 2003).
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B.

The Decision

The prosecution rested in February 2004 and in early March, the
amici filed a motion under Rule 98bis, requesting acquittal on a
number of counts and allegations; the prosecution filed a confidential response. 9 7 Milogevic himself, still not recognizing the
ICTY's authority, filed no motion.9 The chamber issued the Decision on June 16, 2004, allowing each count to stand, but throwing
out some elements of individual charges. 9 9 Judge Robinson wrote
a separate opinion, and Judge Kwon wrote a partial dissent.1 0 0
The Decision is over 140 pages long and goes into considerable
detail about both the legal standard applied and the individual
allegations challenged by the amici--much more detail than Rule
98bis decisions in other cases, which were often "brief rejections
without much reasoning or analysis." 10 1 The length may be
because of the exceptionally large number of allegations on which
the chamber decided to acquit and because of the "important legal
questions . . .concerning the existence of an armed conflict in
97. Prosecutor v. Milogevie, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgement
of Acquittal,
4 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 16, 2004), available at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/tdec/en/040616.htm.
The amici's
motion also included confidential annexes. Id.
98. Id. 1 3.
99. Id. 316-30. Several examples are discussed in the remainder of this Article.
100. Id. at 135-39 (Robinson, J., concurring); id. at 140 (Kwon, J., dissenting in part).
101. BoAs, supra note 14, at 122. The earliest decisions from before 2000 (often
brought under Rule 54, before Rule 98bis was promulgated, or with reference to both) are
only two or three pages-as in Delalil, Blas-kie and Kupreskit-but since then the decisions
have been getting longer: Kordie/Ierkez (2000)-nine pages; Galie (2002)-eleven pages;
Blagjevi/Jokie (2004)-twenty-one pages. See Prosecutor v. Delalie, Case No. IT-96-21,
Order on the Motions to Dismiss the Indictment at the Close of the Prosecutor's Case
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 18, 1998); Prosecutor v. Blagkit, Case No.
IT-95-14, Decision of Trial Chamber I on the Defence Motion to Dismiss (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 3, 1998); Prosecutor v. Kupreskit, Case No. IT-95-16, Decision on Motion of the Accused Vlatko Kupreskic to the Trial Chamber to Order the Entry
ofJudgement of Acquittal, Pursuant to Rule 98bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 8, 1999); Prosecutor v. Kordit, Case No.
IT-95-14/2, Decision on Defence Motions for Judgment of Acquital (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 6, 2000); Prosecutor v. Galit, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Decision on
the Motion for the Entry of Acquittal of the Accused (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 3, 2002); Prosecutor v. Blagojevie, Case No. IT-02-60, Judgment on Motions
for Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98bis (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 5,
2004). Jelisie (1999) and Sikirica (2001) are considerably longer-forty-four and sixty pages
respectively-but then these deal with successful motions to acquit on genocide charges
(and, in Sikirica, with multiple accused); even these are less than half as long as the Decision in Miloevie. See Prosecutor v. Jelisk, Case No. IT-95-10, Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 1999); Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8, Judgment on Defense Motions to Acquit (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 3,
2001).
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Kosovo, the legal tests for deportati'on and forcible transfer and
existence of Statehood for Croatia" upon which several counts
1 02
relied.
The immediate consequence of the Decision was that trial continued. The accused and the amici--rechristened as assigned
counsel-had to defend against each count, although not against
every element the prosecution had originally advanced in the final
indictment. 10 3 Instead, the chamber ordered the prosecution to
prepare a redlined version of the indictments and it was against
10 4
this version that Milogevic and the assigned counsel defended.
Indirectly, the continuation of the trial led to the climax and
drawn-out d6nouement of the self-representation crisis in Milogevic,
as Milogevic's role in the defense phase became even more central
and his denialist strategy and poor health even more disruptive of
the trial process than the chamber and prosecution had
1 05
envisioned.
C.

Standard of Review

Defeating a motion to acquit imposes an extremely low threshold-more than is required for an initial indictment, but not by

102. BoAS, supra note 14, at 122-23. Dr. Boas was Senior Legal Officer in Trial Chamber III, which heard Milofevil, and therefore has good reason to know. Id. at xviii.
103. Id. at 126 (noting that 183 challenges to allegations were granted).
104. Prosecutor v. Milogevie, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Submission of Red-lined Versions of
Indictments Pursuant to Trial Chamber "Order to Prosecution on Indictments Following
Rule 98bis Decision, at 2 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2004).
105. See Anthony Deutsch, CitingHealth, TribunalAssigns Milosevic 2 Lawyers, AssociATED
PRESS, Sept. 3, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 19362000; Arthur Max, Milosevic's Layers Ask
to Quit, Citing Noncooperation, AssOCATED PRESS, Oct. 28, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR
19273250; Michael P. Scharf, Making a Spectacle of Himself: Milosevic Wants a Stage, Not the
Right to Provide His Own Defense, WASH. PosT, Aug. 29, 2004, at B2; Marlise Simons, Court
Looks for Ways to Speed Milosevic Trial N.Y. TIMEs, July 28, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/
2004/07/28/world/court-looks-for-ways-to-speed-milosevic-trial.html; Milosevic Too Ill for
Self-Defense, AssocITrEn PR.SS, Sept. 3, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 17600367.
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much. 10 6 At the time the Decision was issued, 10 7 Rule 98bis provided for acquittal before the defense phase if the trial chamber
"finds that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction on
that or those charges." 10 8 Within the tribunal's jurisprudence, the
test for insufficiency derives, as so much does, from the Tadic case,
through subsequent refinements in other cases, 10 9 and confirmation by the Appeals Chamber in Jelisic and Milofevic
'Whether there is evidence (if accepted) upon which a tribunal
of fact could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of
the accused on the particular charge in question .. .; thus the
true test is not whether the trier of fact would actually arrive at a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt on the Prosecution evidence if accepted, but whether it could;' or to put it as the
Appeals Chamber later did in the same case, a Trial chamber
should only uphold a Rule 98bis Motion if it is 'entitled to conclude that no reasonable trier of fact could find the evidence
sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt ' 110
Having identified a definitive test, the Miloevic chamber immediately clarifies how it will apply the test, saying it will acquit:
[w] here there is no evidence to sustain a charge l ' [and wl here
there is some evidence, but it is such that, taken at its highest, a
Trial Chamber could not convict on it ...

even if the weakness

in evidence derives from the weight to be attached to it, for
example the credibility of a witness. 112 But [the court continued, w]here there is some evidence, but it is such that its
106. See Steven Freeland, Commentary, in ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER

YUGOSLAVIA 2003, at 129, 135 (Andr6 Klip & G6ran Sluiter eds., 2008) (comparing the test
of Rule 98bis with the prima facie requirement of an indictment, and noting that "[g]iven
that the [Rule 98bis motion] arises after the prosecution has had the opportunity to present its evidence-in-chief before the tribunal, as opposed to simply relying on the evidence
contained in the indictment, this may explain why.., the standard applied by the tribunal
appears to be of a higher threshold than with the confirmation of an indictment"); Karel
de Meester, Commentary, in ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 2003-2004, at
449, 455 (Andr6 Klip & G6ran Sluiter eds., 2010) ("The standard of proof required in Rule
98bis proceedings is lower than the standard of proof normally required in criminal
proceedings.").
107. The Rule was amended shortly after the Decision was issued, and, as discussed
infra Part III.D.1, probably in consequence of it.

108.

See ICTY R. P. & EvmD. 98bis (B) (1999) (amended Dec. 8, 2004).

109.

The Decision notes the contributions from Delalie and Kordil. Prosecutor v.

Milogevi , Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgement of Acquittal, 1 9-10
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 16, 2004), available at http://www.icty.
org/x/cases/slobodanmilosevic/tdec/en/040616.htm.
110. Id. 9 (citing Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Judgement, 1 37 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 5, 2001)).
111. Id. 13(1).
112. Id. 13(2).
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strength or weakness depends on the view taken of a witness'
credibility and reliability, and on one possible view of the facts a
could convict on it, [the trial should
Trial Chamber
113
continue].

Sufficiency should be determined "on the basis of the evidence
as a whole," 1 4 but the chamber also considers "the sufficiency of
the evidence [for a given charge] as it pertains to elements of [the]
charge"' 1 5 -that is, not as an all-or-nothing evaluation of the whole
charge. It was on this basis that the chamber was ultimately able to
acquit Milogevic on hundreds of specific allegations while preserving each overall count.
Throughout its deliberation on a motion to acquit, the chamber

is obliged to take the prosecution's evidence at its highest-to
assume the evidence's credibility unless it is utterly incapable of
belief.1 16 This is true of all the factual evidence: in discussing the
question of Milogevic's guilt under a so-calledJCE III theory,' 17 the
chamber noted that it:
will not make a final determination as to the one or the other
basis at this stage, that is, whether to acquit the Accused at this
stage of one or the other basis of liability. The reason is that a
determination as to the Accused's liability depends to a certain
extent on issues of fact and the weight to be attached to certain
items of evidence, which calls for an assessment of the credibility
do not arise for
and reliability of that evidence. These issues
118
determination until the judgement phase.
Much of the chamber's reasoning will sound familiar to lawyers
in the common law tradition, because it is, almost verbatim, the
motion for "no case to answer." Indeed, the chamber's application
113. Id. 1 13(3).
114. Id. 1 13(4).
13(1).
115. Id.
116. See id. 13(3) (obliging the Chamber to uphold the prosecution evidence if"on
one possible view of the facts a Trial Chamber could convict on it"); and id. 1 13 (6) (citing
Prosecutor v. Jelisic, IT-95-10-A, Judgement 1 55 (July 5, 2001) ("The Trial Chamber was
required to assume that the prosecution's evidence was entitled to credence unless incapable of belief. That is, it was required to take the evidence at its highest and could not pick
and choose among parts of that evidence.").
117. This is the broadest form of JCE, contemplating liability for all members of the
JCE for any reasonably foreseeable crimes committed by any members, even if the others
did not share the requisite mens rea for those crimes. See Rebecca L. Haffajee, Note, Prosecuting Crimes of Rape and Sexual Violence at the ICTR, 29 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 201, 214
(2006). For example, genocide, which is a special intent crime, could be charged against a
member of a JCE of type III, even if that member, himself, did not intend to commit
genocide. This was one of the bases for the charge of genocide against Milogevit, and
which will turn out to play an important role in how we must understand the meaning and
utility of the Decision.
118. Milogevie, Decision on Motion forJudgement of Acquittal 1 293.
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of the Jelisic test follows point for point the logic of the classic formulation from R v. Galbraith, which the Decision quotes at
length.1 1 9
The Decision consistently distinguishes between "the Trial Chamber" deciding this case and "a Trial Chamber" when considering
the standard of review.1 20 It is therefore advancing something
rather like the typical appellate standard: an appellate court normally reverses the court below only if no reasonable trier of fact
could find otherwise, just as, in this case, the chamber will acquit
only if no reasonable trier of fact could convict-even if this particular trier of fact, the trial chamber sitting in this case, already
knows it would not. Indeed, the chamber reiterates that "a ruling
that there is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction on a particular charge does not necessarily mean that the Trial Chamber will,
at the end of the case, return a conviction on that charge[;]" it
even notes that it would be possible to acquit even if the accused
12 1
called no evidence.
The standard of review, and the position of the Decision at the
mid-point of trial, suggest its interim quality. If a chamber accepts
a motion to acquit, this terminates proceedings-a decisive and
consequential step that logically has the same effect as final judgment does within the authoritative narrative model. 122 But if a
chamber denies the motion, trial continues without prejudice to
the final evaluation of the sufficiency and meaning of the evidence,
testimony, briefs, or other elements of the trial, apart from the
minimal gloss that they were not, considered in the most positive
light, impossibly inadequate.
119. Id. 1 12. We will return to the chamber's treatment of the common law analogy in
the next section.
120. See, e.g., id. 13(7) ("When, in reviewing the evidence, the Trial Chamber makes a
finding that there is sufficient evidence, that is taken to mean that there is evidence on
which a Trial chamber could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused.").
121. Id. 13(6). This is a feature of the rule that has caused considerable consternation: "It is apparent that the rationale behind the sui generis 'no case to answer' mechanism
at the ICTY, whereby, following a ruling that there is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction on particular charge at the end of the prosecution ['s] case, it is nonetheless possible
for the same trial chamber to acquit the accused at the end of the case (even where she or
he calls no evidence) has left many at loss." Idi Gaparayi, The Milofevi6 Trial at the Halfway
Stage:Judgement on the Motionfor Acquitta4 17 LEIDENJ. INr'L L. 737, 752 (2004). As we shall
see, this is not the part of the rule that should leave people confused.
122. BoAs, supra note 14, at 122 ("The Rule is crafted as a procedural safeguard to
ensure that in circumstances where 'even on its own evidence the prosecution has failed to
prove its case', [sic] the proceedings against an accused can be terminated.").
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But as to the effect on final judgment, there is no valence, or
almost none, from denying a Rule 98bis motion, as the Milogevic
chamber did. The only effect is to continue the trial-and at the
time, as their behavior suggests, this was the expectation of all parties, which means they too understood the Decision as an interim
step, rather than something final.1 23 How then did those various
actors react to the prospect, and then the fact, of the Decision?
Did those reactions change when what was supposed to be interim
became terminal?
III.

ASYMMETRICAL STRATEGIC INTERESTS
SURROUNDING THE DECISION

The different parties had very different interests in the Decision.
Obviously, the prosecution, Milogevic, and the amici desired different outcomes, but they, and the judges, also had different institutional relationships to the Decision that created not merely
opposing or divergent interests, but asymmetries affecting how
they interpreted and reacted to the Decision.
A.

The Accused

Milogevic, who had consistently denied the legitimacy of the tribunal,1 24 did not need to take any position on the Decision; its pronouncements had no authority because to him the tribunal was
illegitimate ab initio. Despite this delegitimizing strategy, however,
Milogevic took an increasingly active part in the trial 125 and certainly had a strategic interest in the Decision: full acquittal would
have been a triumphant vindication for him, and even acquittal on
123. Carla Del Ponte's address to the Security Council on June 30, 2004, just after the
Decision, did not mention the Miloevie case in particular. Press Release, Int'l Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Address by Carla del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, to the United Nations Security
Council (June 30, 2004), available at http://www.icty.org/sid/8404.
124. See, e.g., SCHARF & SCHABAS, supra note 69, at 97-100.
125. See BOAS, supra note 14, at 12 ("Milosevic himself had no intention of playing into
the prosecution's hands and remaining mute while the case against him was laid out and
determined. Despite his belligerence towards the court, he engaged in a robust and, at
times, competent forensic defence."); Joanne Williams, Slobodan Milosevic and the Guarantee
of Self-Representation, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 553, 582 (2007) ("Milosevic 'fully engaged in the
cross-examination of Prosecution witnesses' and presented consecutive witnesses in his
defense, thereby actively partaking in trial proceedings" (quoting Prosecution Response to
"Assigned Counsel Appeal Against the Trial Chamber's Decision on Assignment of
Defence Counsel" and to "Defence Reply to 'Prosecution Motion to Strike Ground of
Appeal (3) from Assigned Counsel Appeal Against the Trial Chamber's Decision on
Assignment of Defence Counsel'"
90 n.144, Prosecutor v. Milogevit, Case No. IT-02-54AR73.7 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 11, 2004))).
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some counts would have brought the prosecution's case into
question.
Milogevic may have been genuinely concerned that the Decision
could be interpreted as a vindication of the prosecution's basic
claims, or he may not have perceived its potential for undermining
the prosecution's case, but, either way, his rejectionist strategy led
him to not fully exploit opportunities presented to him by the
Decision, such as stressing the large number of specific allegations
that were dropped.1 26 To do so would have required him to
change the public strategy he had consistently followed throughout the trial. Exploiting the Decision would have meant engaging
with it, not only pragmatically, 1 27 but in a way that would legitimate
it: emphasizing that it had acquitted him on some allegations
would not only have begged the question about all the others, but
also conceded the chamber's authority to acquit him. Milogevic's
grand strategy of public rejectionism encouraged him to a judicious silence; after all, he had not even filed his own motion for
acquittal-Milogevic was not asking the court for judgment.
126. The transcripts for the defense phase do not show Milogevit discussing the Decision, although the assigned counsel and prosecution do on various occasions. Once, after
it is first invoked by Judge Robinson, Milogevit makes an oblique reference to the Decision
in a discussion of municipalities in Bosnia in which genocide was charged-some of which
had been removed by the Decision:
JUDGE ROBINSON: You are finished reading that list. Let me remind you, Mr.
Milosevic, that the Rule 98bis decision found that there was not enough evidence
to support the allegation in paragraph 32 [of the indictment] in relation to some
of the villages or municipalities mentioned. In fact, as far as paragraph 32 is
concerned, you need only concern yourself with Brcko, Prijedor, Sanski Most,
Srebrenica, Bijeljina, Kotor Varos, Kljuc, Bosanski Novi. And I am checking to
see whether the decision affected paragraph 33.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, could you please let me know
what evidence, as you say there was no evidence for these places, but what was the
evidence that Mr. Nice presented here about the other places linking meJUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic. Mr. Milosevic, the Rule 98bis decision was
published and was available to you. But I bring that to your attention so we don't
waste time. And I'll ask the legal officer to give me the information in relation to
paragraph 33. Go ahead, Mr. Milosevic.
Transcript of Record at 43693, Prosecutor v. Milogevit, Case No. IT-02-54-T (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 5, 2005). This exchange shows that, in effect,
Milogevit accepted the benefit the Decision conferred-its removal of certain municipalities from the list of allegations-but, persisted in denying that any evidence had been submitted and, apparently, refused to actually read the Decision (or to admit that he had).
127. See BoAs, supra note 14, at 12 (noting that Milogevit "all the time maintain[ed] at
least the facade that he was interested only in telling the 'truth' to the world, a political and
social truth, that placed NATO and its member States, as well as the Vatican, on trial. Yet
although the rhetoric gradually subsided and Milogevit cooperated superficially with the
trial process and the institution he had vowed to bring down, his conduct and manipulative
talents continued to have an extraordinary impact on the viability of the proceedings.").
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But for the amici curiae, prosecution, and chamber, the calculus
was different: their roles in the trial process assumed, accepted,
and depended upon the Tribunal's legitimacy. They needed to
engage with the Decision substantively and procedurally, and had
incentives to characterize it in particular ways to the other parties
and the world.
B.

The Amici Curiae

The amici could hardly ignore or ultimately undermine the Decision; after all, they had filed the original motion of acquittal-a
power they had evidently actively sought. 28 Thus, the amici's strategic position in relation to the Decision is perhaps most conventionally contrasted with that of the prosecution: seeking
diametrically opposed outcomes, but in a structurally analogous
position vis-A-vis the institution. In filing the motion for acquittal,
the amici appeared to be standing in for the accused.
But to suppose that the amici curiae occupied the structural position normally filled by a cooperative defendant is not entirely right
because, as their name and the history of their appointment
implies, the amici were formally mandated to aid the court, not the
accused. The chamber first appointed the amici when it became
clear that Milogevic was going to refuse counsel and represent himself; their mandate was "not to represent the accused but to assist
in the proper determination of the case" and specifically to "assist
the Trial Chamber"1 29 by:
(a) making any submissions properly open to the accused by way
of preliminary or other pre-trial motion; (b) making any submissions or objections to evidence properly open to the accused
during the trial proceedings and cross-examining witnesses as
appropriate; (c) drawing to the attention of the Trial Chamber
any exculpatory or mitigating evidence; and (d) acting in any
other way which designated counsel considers appropriate in
order to secure a fair trial .... 130
128. Prosecutor v. Milogevie, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order on Amici Curiae Request Concerning the Manner of their Future Engagement and Procedural Directions under Rule
98bis, at 2-3 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former YugoslaviaJune 27, 2003) (noting the amici's
request for clarification of their role in relation to Rule 98bis and authorizing the absence
of one of the amici from July 2003 forward to prepare the motion).
129. Prosecutor v. Milogevie, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Order Inviting Designation of Amicus Curiae, 2 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 30, 2001).
130. Id.; see also WILLAM A. ScHABAs, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE
FORMER YUGOsLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE 621 (2006) (discussing the role of the

amid curiae in Milolevic).
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Thus, although the amici indeed were empowered to represent
certain interests of the accused, they were also circumscribed in
that power and had other, distinct obligations running to the
The amici were far from true substitutes for the
chamber. 13
accused, with whom they shared only an imperfect identity of
interest.
Consistent with the amici's role as advisors to the chamber rather
than substitute defense counsel, their motion to acquit was
restrained and neutral: in particular, the amici did not challenge
the prosecution's core theory of Milogevic's liability and they did
not actually move for acquittal on all charges; instead, they challenged a narrower range of counts and charges for which the prosecution had presented no evidence whatsoever, or which relied on
a particular legal test or interpretation the amici contested. 13 2 In
the first group were, for example; most allegations of shelling and
sniping at Sarajevo; those in the second group concerned disagreement about the dates on which armed conflict in Kosovo had
begun and Croatia had become a state-issues affecting the jurisdiction of the tribunal and that concerned a choice of legal theories as much as factual claims.13 3 The amici also challenged certain
34
allegations that had been charged under multiple theories.1
131. This role was consistent with the evolving understanding of amici's purpose. See
BOAS, supra note 14, at 251-56 (describing how the role of the amici curiae in the Miloevie
trial differs from their tradition functions). See generally Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae
Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694 (1963) (describing the historical definition of the amicus curiaein common law and the shift of its role from neutrality to advocacy
in the U.S.). Krilsov explains that:
On occasion, the amicus curiae has been an agent of the court acting as champion of the court's point of view, vigorously pursuing and defending a legal position at the request of the bench itself. In the main, however, the amicus curiae
has been a means of fostering partisan third party involvement through the
encouragement of group representation by a self-conscious bench.
Id. at 720-21.
132. BoAS, supra note 14, at 126-28 (noting that the amici curiae "did not challenge the
prosecution case in respect of [Milogevit's] criminal responsibility" but only the 185 separate allegations).
133. These claims, had they been accepted, would have led to acquittal on counts
under Articles 3 and 5 of the statute.
134. For example, the amici moved for dismissal of some allegations concerning forced
removals from the village of Nogavac, which had formed part of Kosovo Counts 1 and 2.
Count 1 referred to deportation, which involves forced transfer over an international frontier; Count 2 referred to forcible transfer, which involves forced transfer inside a state. The
prosecution incorporated by reference the same paragraphs for both counts. See Amici
Curiae Motion for Judgement of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98bis 1 39-60, Prosecutor v.
Milogevie, Case No. IT-02-54-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2004)
(discussing forced transfers and the climate of terror). The amici objected that for removals from the village of Nogavac, there was no evidence of removal across a frontier, and
therefore they challenged that allegation as part of Count 1, but they did not challenge the
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Only on Bosnia did the amici challenge more directly the prosecution's evidentiary basis by arguing that there was no evidence that
Milogevic committed or was complicit in genocide; they also disputed the prosecution's theory concerning the proper mens rea for
joint criminal enterprise of the broad JCE III type. 13 5 Apart from
the genocide charges, however, the amici did not challenge entire
counts for Bosnia, only specific allegations in the Schedules. 136
As for the other allegations and counts not directly challenged,
the amici's brief "does not comment upon the sufficiency of the
evidence called by the [p]rosecution on those counts upon which
no submission to acquit has been made under Rule 98bis."13 7 Perhaps the amici thought this was a form of professional resolve, a
refusal to concede other matters; but of course, they were the ones
who decided what to request acquittal for, and what not to. By the
very act of not commenting, they all but ensured-unless the
judges took it up propio motu-that everything else would be
passed through to the defense phase. Concerning the amici's failure to challenge the core theory of liability, Boas notes:
This reticence is curious, given the relative success achieved in
respect of the crime base evidence challenged and the dissent of
Judge Kwon[ 38 ] in respect of the accused's lack of genocidal
intent. Perhaps the amici curiae were concerned that unsuccessful challenges on the accused's actual responsibility might create an undesirable expectation or impression. Perhaps the
prosecution can consider itself fortunate this avenue was not
13 9
pursued further.
Of course, neither an amicus nor a defense attorney should necessarily challenge everything. The question on a motion to acquit
is not "will the evidence suffice," but "might it suffice if uncontradicted." An actor playing by the rules, as the amici were, ought not
challenge evidence that, on its face, seems to require a defensesame evidence for Count 2 (as three of the five witnesses gave sufficient evidence of forcible transfer). See id.
135. Id.
161-62; see also Prosecutor v. Milogevie, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on
Motion for Judgement of Acquittal,
5 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June
16, 2004), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodanmilosevic/tdec/erf/040616.
htm (summarizing the amici's Motion).
136. Amici Curiae MotionforJudgement of Acquittal Pursuantto Rule 98bis, Case No. IT-0254-T,
161-63 (noting the various charges but then only discussing the genocide counts
and stating that "Schedules A-F [which follow] contain only those alleged crimes upon
which it is submitted that there is either no evidence or insufficient evidence to sustain the
retention of the allegation within the Indictment at this stage").
137. Id. 1 2.
138. See discussion infra Part III.D.2.
139. BoAs, supra note 14, at 127-28.
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and, as Boas has just noted, it might be strategically unwise to do
so. Playing by the rules, however, does not preclude pressing one's
advantage; even a cooperative defendant would challenge any evidence that is vulnerable. It is not clear the amici conceived of their
role this way. For charges concerning the siege of Sarajevo, the
amici challenged all but one sniping and one shelling allegation;
leaving those single allegations in place ensured that, even if the
chamber accepted the amici's arguments-as it did-the count
would survive. 1 40 It is also questionable whether the amici's decision to focus on the legal standards for armed conflict and international conflict in Kosovo and Croatia truly targeted the weak points
in the prosecution's case.
This restraint and neutrality, while a professional response to the
amici's ambiguous structural position between the accused and
chamber, undermines the potential utility of the Decision. If the
amici were in any way constrained by their role-by their lack of an
identity of interest with Milogevic, then it is less clear to what
degree the Decision even represents a robust adjudication of the
evidence, at least in the way the tribunal's adversarial process
requires. Indeed, the consequences of the amici's imperfect identity with the accused are all the more acute precisely because of the
adversarial process, for which an identity between defendant and
zealous attorney is assumed and essential. A less adversarial process might make the disjuncture between defendant and "friend of
the court" less disruptive of the narrative goals of ICL, but that
would have required the ICTY to be formed on entirely different
141
principles.
C.

The Prosecution

The prosecution approached the impending conclusion of its
case and a possible Rule 98bis motion in an atmosphere of
doubt; 142 many observers suggested it had failed to assemble a
coherent and compelling case, and believed it was likely to secure
140. See discussion of the Sarajevo counts infra Part IV.A.
141. See supra note 27 (discussing the adversarial nature of the ICTY). The Chamber
itself had tools at its disposal, such as the power to call expert witnesses, but did not use
these - itself, perhaps, another example of the implicitly common law style of the Tribunal.
See discussion of the Chamber, infra Part III.D.
142. The prosecution concluded its case early, without making a closing statement. See
Prosecutor v. Milogevic, Case No. IT-02-54, Decision on Notification of the Completion of
Prosecution Case and Motion for the Admission of Evidence in Written Form (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 25, 2004) (discussing the prosecution's filing giving
notice of its intent to close its case); Stacy Sullivan, Muted End to Milosevic Prosecution, IWPR
(Nov. 9, 2005), http://iwpr.net/report-news/muted-end-milosevic-prosecution.
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conviction only on some counts, but not, critically, on genocide. 1 43
To these observers, a Decision granting acquittal on even a few
counts in its flagship case would have been catastrophic for the
prosecution. Still, given its structural position as an integral element of the ICTY, the prosecution could not openly contest the
legitimacy of the process; its options, if an adverse decision were
handed down, would have been restricted to procedural maneuvers and questioning the wisdom of this particular chamber's reasoning, but within a framework of institutional buy-in that
compelled, in public at least, its acquiescence and obedience. For
the prosecution, Milogevic's strategy of defiant nonchalance was
simply not available.
Initially, the prosecution placed its hopes on a Rule 98bis motion
not being filed at all. Prosecutors could reasonably expect that
Milogevic would not file one and so their strategy focused on the
amici. The prosecution objected to letting the amici file a Rule
98bis motion, on the theory that they were not "a party to the proceedings," 144 as the Rule requires; 145 either the accused should file,
or no one should. This preemptive strategy failed, however, and
when the chamber rejected its argument, 146 the prosecution
turned to a conventional defense of its case. 14 7 Its approach was
technical and correct, but far less conflicted than the amici's; in its
briefs, the prosecution readily conceded the absence or insufficiency of evidence on numerous allegations, while nonetheless urg143. See, e.g., U.N.Failed in Milosevic Genocide Case, Experts Say, ASSOCIATED PREss, Feb.
29, 2004, available at http://www.sptimes.com/2004/02/29/Worldandnation/UNfailed_
inMilosevi.shtml ("When U.N. prosecutors opened their case against Slobodan Milosevic
two years ago, they set out to get him convicted of genocide. The consensus today is, they
failed .... 'The prosecution was underwhelming,' said Michael Scharf"); Milosevic Likely to
be Acquitted on Genocide Charges,FOXNEws.coM (Feb. 28, 2004), http://www.foxnews.com/
story/0,2933,112820,00.html ("Trial-watchers believe the prosecutors built an impregnable
case that Milosevic was involved in war crimes in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo during the
wars of the 1990s that tore apart the Yugoslav federation. But they failed to show an intent
to commit genocide, experts said.").
144. Prosecution Motion Under Rule 73(A) for a Ruling on the Competence of the
Amici Curiaeto Present a Motion forJudgement of Acquittal Under Rule 98bis 1 2, Prosecutor v. Milogevit, Case No. IT-02-54-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 4,
2004).
145. See ICTY R. P. & EVID. 98bis (B) (1999) (amended Dec. 8, 2004).
146. Prosecutor v. Milogevie, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Prosecution's Motion
Under Rule 73 (A) for a Ruling on the Competence of the Amici Curiae to Present a
Motion forJudgement of Acquittal Under Rule 98bis, at 2 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Feb. 5, 2004).
147. Prosecution Response to Amici Curiae Motion forJudgment of Acquittal Pursuant
to Rule 98bis 5, Prosecutor v. Milogevit, Case No. IT-02-54-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia May 3, 2004).
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ing the chamber to maintain all counts.1 4 8 After the Decision came
down, the prosecution undertook a rearguard action to preserve
the overall scope of the case against which Milogevic would have to
1 49
defend, an action to which we shall return.
D.

The Chamber

For the chamber, of course, the Decision's legitimacy was not in
question; the judges-Robinson, Bonomy, and Kwon 1 5 0-had no
interest in minimizing the effects of the Decision they had written.
Their concern, rather, would have been with its consequent impact
on the remainder of the trial and on the ICTY's jurisprudence and
legacy; in particular, they would have an interest in how the Decision affected other Rule 98bis proceedings. Like the other actors
in the trial, the judges were aware of the Decision's interim function and were not expecting it would turn out to be the most definitive statement they were allowed to make. The judges' subsequent
behavior, even before the trial was terminated, suggests they were
appalled at the length and comprehensiveness of the document
51
they had produced, and took steps to avoid a repetition.1
The most significant tension that arises in connection with the
Decision involves the role of judges at the ICTY as the ultimate
trier of fact. The Decision discusses at some length the relationship of Rule 98bis to the claim of "no case to answer," and indeed,
this is yet another example of extensive common law influence on
the Rules. Although the Decision is at pains to assert that domestic
rules are not to be imported wholesale into the ICTY's jurisprudence, this is precisely what it does with the standard from R v.
Galbraith.152 Yet the chamber's rule-though it is directly derived
from the common law-produces a very different dynamic with
very different implications in the context of a trial at the ICTY.
The chamber discusses the ways in which the Rule 98bis procedure derives, but also differs, from the common law motion. Presumably, the reason why the judges felt it important to distinguish
148. See generally id. For example, for Croatia, the prosecution agreed that (1) detention camps listed in 64(b) (Kumbor) and I 64(f) (Zrenjanin) should be excised from the
71 of the
indictment (part of counts 6 to 13) and (2) Celija should be excised from
indictment (part of counts 17 to 20). See id. 1 200-02, 218-19.
149. This is discussed at length infra Part IV.
150. Judge May had withdrawn from the case the previous month and died shortly
thereafter. See Press Release, Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Sir Richard May (July 1, 2004), http://www.icty.org/sid/8402.
151. See infra Part III.D.1.
152. See Gaparayi, supra note 121, at 750-51.
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Rule 98bis from its common law antecedent arises from one of the
key structural differences between the ICTY and the common law:
namely, the lack of a jury. In the common law, criminal cases are
almost always heard before a jury, 153 which is the "trier of fact,"
while the judge acts as a supervisory "trier of law." The chamber
notes that "an essential function of the procedure [at common
law] is to ensure that at the end of the [p]rosecution's case[,] the
jury is not left with evidence which cannot lawfully support a conviction; otherwise it may bring in an unjust conviction."1 54 At the
ICTY, both these roles are vested in the chamber, and the traditional purpose of "no case to answer" is, in a sense, a solution with1 55
out a problem.
Thus, it is curious that, in describing a circumstance in which the
Milogevic case should continue (namely, if there is evidence that
could be sufficient for conviction), the chamber asserts that "[t] his
accords with the general principle in common law jurisdictions
that a judge must not allow a submission of no case to answer
because he considers the prosecution's evidence to be unreliable,
[because] by doing so he would usurp the function of the jury as
the tribunal of fact.' 1 56 As the chamber is the trier of fact, it would
only be usurping itself.
Still, well thought out or not, having put this gloss on their own
logic, the judges signal that they are not signaling their own view
about the evidence's ultimate sufficiency. Unless its express wording indicates something else-unless, in effect, the chamber has
arrogated to itself more scope than it is supposed to-the Decision
primarily stands for the proposition that the prosecution has not
been irremediably incompetent and that it delivered some of what
it promised in the initial indictment, at least enough of it to
continue. 157
153. See Frances Gibb, First Criminal Trial With No Jury for 400 Years Starts, TiMES
(London), Jan. 13, 2010, http://business.mesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article6984
904.ece.
154. Prosecutor v. Milogevit, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgement
of Acquittal,
11 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 16, 2004), available at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan-milosevic/tdec/en/040616.htm.
155. One former ICTY prosecutor notes that "the motion has served more as a tool of
trial management, one that allows the Chamber to 'prune' cases (historically, quite large)
by identifying those portions of the indictment that are not sufficiently supported."
Dermot Groome, Adjudicating Genocide: Is the InternationalCourt ofJustice Capable ofJudging
State Criminal Responsibility?, 31 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 911, 963 (2008).
156. Milosevie, Decision on Motion forJudgement of Acquittal
13(3).
157. Cf Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-0142-T, Decision on Defence Motion
Requesting Judgement of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98bis, 17 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia June 21, 2004) ("[R]arely, a case will arise where the only evidence in
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The Pointlessness of Rule 98bis-Robinson's Separate
Opinion

Interestingly, even though the Decision discourses at length on
the common law rule's importance in protecting the jury's role, it
does not mention the obvious disjunction that there are no juries
at the ICTY; instead, it proceeds immediately to formulate its own
rule along the same, common law lines. 158 Only in his separate
opinion does Judge Robinson note that "in principle, there is far
less danger of an unjust conviction at the Tribunal than in criminal
proceedings in common law jurisdictions; there is certainly less
need to insulate judges of a Trial Chamber from evidence which
can not lawfully sustain a conviction." 15 9 Robinson suggests that
this difference should provide the basis for modifying the rules "in
the transition from their domestic berth to the Tribunal." 160 He
adduces the possibility of a different rule from the ICTY's different
structure: "surely the fact that a Trial Chamber is composed of professional judges, whose need to be insulated from weak evidence is
not as great as a lay jury, must make a difference to the application
61
of the no case to answer procedure."1
As it turns out, Robinson's agenda is to cut back the Rule 98bis
proceeding and leave more to the judgment phase:
Charges at the Tribunal are multilayered to a degree that is generally not present in indictments at the domestic level. Thus, a
charge could have as many as a hundred or more separate allegations.... Is it useful to devote the Tribunal's resources to an
exercise which may result in the elimination of a dozen of these
hundred or more individual allegations or details ... while the
charge or count remains intact? Is there any prejudice to an
accused in leaving those dozen individual
allegations for consid162
eration . . . at the judgment phase?
He therefore suggests constricting Rule 98bis to submissions
that are designed to eliminate a charge or count rather than
individual allegations of fact relating thereto; in most cases such
submissions will relate to a missing legal ingredient of a charge,
support of a conviction is so inherently incredible that no Trial Chamber could accept its

truth.").
158. The Decision does mention the principle that domestic procedures do not govern
the Tribunal and must be modified to fit its Statute and purposes. See generally Milofevie,
Decision on Motion for Judgement of Acquittal.
159. Id. I 11 (Robinson, J., concurring).
160. Id. 12.
161. Id. 13.
162. Id. 1 16.
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e.g., mens rea... [and] that allege that there is no evidence,
as
1 63
distinct from insufficient evidence, to sustain a charge.

Thus, on Robinson's view, the "no case to answer" process would
be radically reduced as a measure ofjudicial economy and a consequence of judges' greater professional perspective. 164 One might
question whether the claim of economy is accurate; although much
effort would be saved at the mid-point of the trial, not deciding on
specific allegations would mean the defense would feel compelled,
strategically, to address them all, since it would not know with certainty whether the judges thought the prosecution's case was
strong or weak on any given point. Perhaps Robinson's view is a
function of his frustration at having just waded through the entire
set of claims and counterclaims for the Rule 98bis process. The
Decision took months to write, but then he never actually got to
the final judgment, when-if his preferred approach had been in
65
place-all those claims would have reappeared.
Robinson focuses on the difference judges' professionalism
makes, but surely the more relevant fact is that the Trial Chamber-professional or not 1 66 -is also the ultimate trier of fact. Concern with usurpation of the jury's function is irrelevant in the
unitary model of the ICTY, but not, as Robinson supposes, because
of judges' professional skill, rather because of the total identity
between judge and jury. It is not the judges' professionalism, but
16 7
their position, that makes the Rule 98bis process pointless.
163. Id. 17.
164. Judge Robinson published an article the following year that argued, among other
things, for revision of Rule 98bis. See Patrick L. Robinson, Rough Edges in the Alignment of
Legal Systems in the Proceedingsat the ICTY, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1037, 1047-49 (2005). In
the meantime, his view had prevailed: Rule 98bis was amended in December 2004, shortly
after the Decision in Miloevie, and now allows the Chamber "by oral decision and after
hearing the oral submissions of the parties, [to acquit] on any count if there is no evidence
capable of supporting a conviction." This is Robinson's "whole-count" approach, without
the 140-page document. See Press Release, Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Judges Amend Rule 73(D) and 98bis at Plenary Session (Dec. 10, 2004), available at
http://www.icty.org/sid/8320.
165. The judgment in the MOS trial, involving other members of the same JCE for the
Kosovo phase, ran to four volumes. See generally Prosecutor v. Milutinovit, Case No. IT-0587-T, Judgement (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2009).
166. Some ICTYjudges have had little prior trial experience-and less in criminal trials-being diplomatic appointments.

See The Judges, INT'L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER

YuGOsLUViA, http://www.icty.org/sid/151 (last visited Apr. 3, 2011). The sleepingjudge in
the lbelebiei case is notorious. SeeJernej Letnar lernii, What Happens if a Judge FallsAsleep
Duringthe Trial?, INT'L L. OBSERVER (Nov. 14, 2008), http://internationallawobserver.eu/
2008/1 1/14/what-happens-if-a-judge-falls-asleep-during-the-trial.
167. In his Partial Dissenting Opinion in Jelisie, Judge Fausto Pocar draws this point:
since the judges are the "final arbiters... [t]here is no point in leaving open the possibility
that another trier of fact could come to a different conclusion" and "[t]herefore, if at the
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Predictive Asymmetry in the Decision-Kwon's Dissent

The Decision preserved all the counts against Milogevic, but
Judge Kwon appended a short dissenting opinion concerning the
charge of genocide under a JCE I theory. Genocide under JCE I
requires a showing that an accused actually possessed the special
intent necessary to commit genocide himself, rather than imputing
it or finding that he had "taken" the intent of his co-perpetrators.
The Decision accepted that the prosecution had supplied sufficient
evidence of Milogevic's own intent to allow the trial to continue on
that charge, but Kwon dissented: "I do not agree with the majority
that there is sufficient evidence upon which a Trial Chamber could
find beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused had the dolus
specialis required for genocide." 168 Kwon did not dissent on other
theories, such as JCE III, aiding and abetting or complicity, or
genocide as a superior under Article 7(3), which contemplate liability even if an accused merely knows about or foresees genocidal
harm, but he did not believe it was reasonable to infer Milogevic's
169
own intent from that evidence.
Kwon's dissent does not affect the material outcome of the Decision-no counts were dropped-but it does delimit some elements
of a putative final judgment, because of the asymmetrical information embedded in a Rule 98bis decision. Denial of a motion continues the trial without prejudice, but acquittal has a clear,
incontrovertible meaning. We cannot know how the other two
judges would ultimately have ruled on the question of JCE I liability-it is possible they were convinced of Milogevic's guilt or of his
innocence, yet were determined to follow the correct procedurebut unless there was new evidence introduced in the defense
phase, we can be certain about Kwon. Commenting on the dissent,
Boas says "a considerable question mark was left hanging over this
crucial and emotive aspect of the prosecution's case in respect of
Bosnia-that Milogevic had the specific intent to commit genocide
close of the prosecution case, the judges themselves are convinced that the evidence is
insufficient, then the Chamber must acquit." He concludes by asking, "what is the point in
continuing the proceedings if the same judges have already reached the conclusion that
they will ultimately adopt at a later stage?" Prosecutor v.Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Judgement, at 71,
6 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 5, 2001) (Pocar, J., dissenting in part). It is ironic that it took a judge from the civil law tradition to point this
out.

168. Milofevie, Decision on Motion for Judgement of Acquittal at 140,
dissenting in part).
169. Id. 2.

1 (Kwon,

J.,
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in Srebrenica and elsewhere."' 170 This is diplomatically phrased;
under the logic of Rule 98bis, it is difficult to see how Kwon could
not have acquitted for genocide on any theory requiring the defendant himself to have actual genocidal intent instead of mere knowledge or foreseeability of the risk. On any count depending on the
JCE I theory, at least, Kwon could only have acquitted or dissented.
Though neither they nor anyone else could know it then, the
Decision was-or rather turned out to be-the last major statement by the judges on the evidence. In time, and with the turn of
events, this made the Decision into something more than its
authors originally anticipated. Its appeal as a source for narrating
the events of the Yugoslav wars turned out to be as considerable as
it was doctrinally implausible-for the very thing that is so poorly
thought through in the Decision, the very feature that makes the
Rule 98bis procedure pointless, is the same feature that later made
it seemingly attractive for the authoritative narrative theory.
It is precisely the identity of interest-indeed, the total identity-between the trier of fact and the trier of law at the ICTY that
makes the Decision potentially appealing. A decision to continue a
case at the ICTY might be thought to signal a likely final outcome
with marginally greater confidence than does a similar decision in
the common law because the trier of law and fact are one and the
same. It is entirely possible for a juror to think, "Well, the judge
says let the case continue, but I already know how I'll rule;"
because the common law judge is a separate actor, there is simply
no information in his decision about the jury's view. By contrast,
the judges hearing a Rule 98bis motion are the same ones who will
decide the case; thus, depending on what exactly their decision
says, it might indicate a great deal about their ultimate view. After
all, Kwon certainly would have opposed conviction on a specific
count-so why not look for similar indications elsewhere, perhaps
in the opposite direction? It was, and is, tempting to suppose one
could read a great deal about the meaning of a terminated trial
into what was, initially and structurally, an interim pronouncement. But as almost everyone who attempted to use the Decision
this way was compelled to conclude, and as we shall see, this seeming value is defective and deceptive.

170.

BOAS, supra note 14, at 126.
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A

POTENTIAL FOR AMBIGUITY: CONTEMPORARY
RESPONSES TO THE DECISION

The moment for this potential role's realization lay two years in
the future, however. First, and more pressing, were the parties'
strategic responses to the Decision as the interim declaration it was
designed to be. The immediate outcome of the Decision was what
one observer calls a "zero effect[ :]" 17 1hundreds of allegations
dropped, but all counts still in place. Immediately after the Decision issued, the parties had to busy themselves with preparations
for continued trial. The chamber appointed the amici as assigned
counsel, a move Milogevic contested, and they each, in part, continued the defense.1 72 The prosecution's response to the Decision
was more complex.
A.

Denying Effect-The Prosecution's Redline Indictments

The prosecution, having failed to prevent the motion and Decision, made efforts within the framework of the trial to contextualize the damage to its case. The chamber instructed the
prosecution to produce redline indictments that indicated which
allegations were no longer part of the case. 173 New versions for
Bosnia and Croatia were produced, but not for Kosovo because no
allegations were affected. 174 The new versions are mostly sober,
technical realizations of the chamber's instructions, but the prosecution also added comments that explain or justify marginal calls,
calls which inevitably preserved allegations.
The prosecution defended certain allegations against removal
on the grounds that the amici did not specifically challenge them,
even though they were plausibly covered by the chamber's findings. 175 The amici had challenged many allegations in the large
Schedules attached to the indictment, but generally did not challenge the general allegations in the main text itself, and the prosecution deployed this fact to preserve mention of specific
171. Gaparayi, supra note 121, at 766.
172. See supra Part II.A.
173. Prosecutor v. Milogevit, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order to Prosecution on Indictments
following Rule 98bis Decision, at 2 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 20,
2004).
174. Prosecution's Submission of Red-Lined Versions of Indictments Pursuant to Trial
Chamber "Order to Prosecution on Indictments Following Rule 98bis Decision" 3, Prosecutor v. Milogevit, Case No. IT-02-54-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug.
11, 2004).
175. Id. 7(c)-(d).
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municipalities in the main text for several counts. 176 In terms of
interpreting the Decision, that the amici did not challenge certain
items of evidence with adequate specificity-on the prosecution's
reading-ultimately tells little about what the chamber thought
about those items. It simply raises, again, the question of the
amici's role and their imperfect identity of interest with the
accused.
Similarly, for a persecutions count from Bosnia, 177 the chamber
ruled that allegations for three named municipalities in the Schedules lacked evidence. Nonetheless, the prosecution did not line
them out in the main text, arguing that "[i]n the Prosecution's
opinion[,] findings of insufficient evidence in relation to the
Schedules of the Bosnia Indictment do not necessitate the deletion
of [those]

municipalities . . . as the allegations contained in

paragraphs 33-35 are broader than the specific allegations con178
tained in the Schedules."'
The most striking changes are to the Sarajevo sniping and shelling counts. For both of these counts, the chamber ordered acquittal on all specific incidents alleged except one each: the shooting
of Seid Solak, a thirteen-year-old boy wounded in the abdomen,
179
and the notorious Markale incident that killed sixty-six people.
0
These were also the only incidents not challenged by the amici;i8
176. Id. 7(b)-(d). On the locations in which genocide was alleged, Boas has a succinct discussion of the complicated transit from the original fourteen pleaded to seven,
with the court acquitting in one. BOAS, supra note 14, at 124-26.
177. This was Count 3. Id. I 7(b).
178. Id. I 7(b) n.4 ("The Prosecution did not lead all of its evidence regarding ...
persecutions in this municipality because of limitations on time. The Prosecution relies
primarily on the expert reports of [three named experts] to meet their burden of proof.").
Prior indications of this strategy appear in the pre-Decision brief. Prosecution Response to
Amici Curiae Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98bis 5, Prosecutor v.
Milogevit, Case No. IT-02-54-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 3, 2004)
("Where the Amid submit that no evidence.., has been led of crimes set out in Schedules
A-F ...the Prosecution takes the challenge to relate to the crimebase evidence. In respect
of the responsibility of the Accused for the crimes in question, the Prosecution refers generally to the evidence as summarized in [the three reports] which goes to establishing the
responsibility of the accused for the remaining crimes in the indictment, and to which the
Motion does not refer specifically."). In their brief, the amici had not said anything specific
about paragraphs 33-35 of the indictment. See generally Amici Curiae Motion for Judgement of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98bs, Prosecutor v. Milogevit, Case No. IT-02-54-T
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2004).
179. Prosecutor v. Milogevit, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgement
of Acquittal, 11 310-15 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former YugoslaviaJune 16, 2004), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan milosevic/tdec/en/040616.htm.
180. It is not clear why only these two incidents were not challenged. The amic's brief
does not discuss any evidence for them (unless it is in the confidential annexes), nor does
the prosecution's (because they were not challenged). See generally Amici Curiae Motion
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the other forty-three sniping incidents and twenty-six shelling incidents alleged were, and the prosecution, conceding that these incidents lacked specific supporting evidence, had unsuccessfully
submitted that "'overview evidence' of a shelling and sniping campaign in Sarajevo . . . is sufficient" for a conviction. 18 1
Still, although it had to line out all these incidents, the prosecution was able to preserve the entire chapeau, describing the
killing and wounding [of] thousands of civilians of all ages and
both sexes .... an extensive, four-month shelling and sniping
attack... a protracted campaign of shelling and sniping ....
[against] civilians who were, amongst other things, tending vegetable plots, queuing for bread or water, attending funerals,
18 2
shopping in markets, riding on trams, [and] gathering wood.
The chapeau even continues to note that "[s] pecific instances of
sniping are described in Schedule E attached to this indictment.
Specific instances of shelling are set forth in Schedule F." 18 3 When
one reads these schedules now, these instances are still set forth,
but with lines through them. No changes are made to the text of
the indictment itself, however, and anyone reading the indictment
would not notice anything.
The prosecution also preserved the seven overlapping countscharacterizing the sniping and shelling as murder (a crime against
humanity and a violation of the laws or customs of war); inhumane
acts (a crime against humanity); willful killing (a grave breach);
willfully causing great suffering (a grave breach); cruel treatment
(a violation of the laws or customs of war); and attacks on civilians
(a violation of the laws or customs of war) 184-all above an allegation set that now consisted ofjust one incident each of sniping and
shelling. This is entirely correct-it is possible to characterize a
single incident in multiple ways, and to base a count on allegations
in the main text rather than the schedules-but it is also extraordiforJudgement of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98bis, Prosecutor v. Milogevit, Case No. IT-0254-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2004); ProsecutionResponse to Amici
Curiae Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98bis, Case No. IT-02-54-T. The
Markale shelling, however, killed many more people than any other incident and had been
subjected to extensive review concerning the direction from which the shell had been
fired.
313; see also Prosecution
181. Miloevie, Decision on Motion forJudgement of Acquittal
Response to Amici Curiae Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Pursuantto Rule 98bis, Case No. IT484.
02-54-T,
182. Prosecution's Submission of Red-Lined Versions of Indictments Pursuant to Trial
Chamber, Prosecutor v. Milogevie, Case No. IT-02-54-T, attach. B, 1 43-45 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 11, 2004).
45.
183. Id. attach. B,
184. Id.
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narily hollowed out. Because the chamber did not consider the
prosecution's "overview evidence" sufficient to preserve the other
forty-three sniping and twenty-six shelling allegations, what exactly
remained aside from the single pleaded instance of each? Yet, the
formal outcome-the preservation of all counts, and of the original text-masks this, leaving the impression that nothing of substance has changed and that no doubt or qualification has entered
the juridical calculus.
The prosecution encourages this impression by suggesting that
the redline indictments are not amended indictments at all, but
only
working documents of value to clarify the case that the Defense
has to meet. It may be thought that the Croatia and Bosnia
Indictments should remain unchanged from the moment that
the Prosecution case closed in order to best assist the parties
and the public to be able to assess what was alleged, what was the
subject of acquittal by the Trial Chamber and what (if any)
counts are the subject of convictions in due course. 185
This is unobjectionable in a technical sense, but it also asserts a
mystifying continuity between the original indictment, which contained allegations on which Milogevic had been acquitted, and the
subsequent revision. More generally, the mere presence of the
prosecution's explanatory notes, when a simple redaction without
comment could have been done, suggests an effort to frame the
outcome to their advantage. The effect is not so much to delegitimize the Decision-this is hardly a plausible public strategy for
the prosecution-as to contextualize it, seeking to preserve and
insulate as much of the prosecution's case as possible. At the time,
this was done in order to preserve options for trial, but later it
would serve a different purpose.
B.

Summaries ofJudgment-ContemporaryReactions to the Decision

Apart from the parties' strategic responses in the courtroom,
outsiders had to consider how to present the Decision. One understandable tendency was to compress the enormous and tedious186
ruling into a shorter and simpler text, but with an unfortunate
effect: The special meaning the Decision attaches to the phrase
185. Id. 4.
186. Large sections of the Decision consist of charts summarizing particular allegations
challenged by the amici, the prosecution's response, and the chamber's disposition. Without the underlying briefs and evidence for reference, these anodyne recitations convey all
the analytical depth of an "am not/are so" dispute. See Milofevie, Decision on Motion for
Judgement of Acquittal at 111-29.
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"sufficient evidence" drops out, leaving the impression that the
chamber has carefully reviewed and accepted the prosecution's
claims of guilt, full stop.
Recall that in applying the Rule 98bis standard, the judges are
asking whether any reasonable court could find the evidence, if
taken at its highest, sufficient for conviction. 187 They note this
standard early in the Decision, indicating that it applies throughout the 140 pages that follow: "When, in reviewing the evidence,
the Trial Chamber makes a finding that there is sufficient evidence, that is to be taken to mean that there is evidence on which a
Trial Chamber could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the
guilt of the accused."' 8 8 This qualifier applies to every conclusion
upholding a count or allegation. The judges, understandably, did
not write it out each time, but the consequence was that contemporary reports of the Decision cite its findings in ways that suggest
that this Trial Chamber found the prosecution's case plausible or
persuasive.
These elisions do not appear willful or egregious, and in many
instances, observers get it about right, in part. A U.N. press release
from June 17, 2004, for example, refers to the chamber's "dismiss [ing] a legal motion ... after finding there is enough evidence
for him to answer."1 89 Later, though, the text starts to cut corners-much as the judges themselves did in the Decision's
disposition:
In dismissing the motion . . .the ICTY rejected several submissions regarding Bosnia. The judges found that there is enough
evidence to show that there was a joint criminal enterprise... to
destroy part of Bosnia's Muslims as a group; that Mr. MilogeviC
was part of the enterprise; and that the enterprise committed
genocide."1 9 0
Anyone copying text from the Decision's disposition could reach
this misleading conclusion because the judges' qualifier for
"enough evidence" appears over 300 paragraphs earlier.
Other examples extend this shortcut analysis. A summary in
International Legal Materials (ILM) (derivative of the Trial Chamber's own summary) characterizes the Decision in words that sug187. See supra Part II.C (discussing the standard of review).
13(7).
188. Miloevie, Decision on Motion for judgement of Acquittal
189. Press Release, United Nations, UN War Crimes Tribunal Dismisses Bid to Acquit
Milogevic (June 16, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=
11068&Cr--ICTY&Crl=.
190. Id.
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gest the chamber actually made factual findings of guilt against
Milogevic:
[W] ith respect to the Amici Curiaesubmissions concerning genocide in Bosnia, the Trial Chamber dismissed the motion. Consequently, the Trial Chamber held: (1) there was sufficient
evidence of a joint criminal enterprise, which included members of the Bosnian Serb leadership, the aim and intention of
which was to destroy a part of the Bosnian Muslims as a group;
(2) Slobodan Milosevic was a participant in that joint criminal
enterprise; (3) Slobodan Milosevic was a participant in a joint
criminal enterprise, which included members of the Bosnian
Serb leadership, to commit crimes other than genocide and it
was reasonably foreseeable to him that, as a consequence of the
commission of those crimes, genocide would be committed by
other participants in the joint criminal enterprise, and it was
committed; (4) Slobodan Milosevic aided and abetted or was
complicit in the commission of the crime of genocide in that he
had knowledge of the joint criminal enterprise, and that he gave
its participants substantial assistance, being aware that its aim
was the destruction of a part of the Bosnian Muslims as a group;
and (5) Slobodan Milosevic was a superior to certain persons
whom he knew or had reason to know were about to commit or
had committed genocide of a part of the Bosnian Muslims as a
group, and he failed to take the necessary measures to prevent
the commission of genocide, or punish the perpetrators
thereof.191

A plain reading of the ASIL note suggests the chamber actually
held that Milogevic was a participant in two joint criminal enterprises, and aided and abetted or was complicit in genocide. The
chamber held nothing of the kind. Although the Decision uses
almost identical language in its disposition, 192 it does so with
implicit reference back to the qualifying language, which drops out
of the ASIL summary.
No one with legal training, or even good sense, reading these
reports would be confused in some absolute way-the same reports
also make clear that the trial continues. Nor is it likely that this
191. InternationalLaw in Brief. International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) (Trial Chamber IIl): Prosecutor v. Milogevit, AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. (June 25, 2004),
http://www.asil.org/ilib07l1.cfm#j7.
192. Critically, the Decision places "sufficient evidence" outside the first point, where it
modifies all five tentative findings, while the ILM summary moves it inside, where it modifies only the first. Compare Milogevi(, Decision on Motion forJudgement of Acquittal 1 323
("[Tihe Trial Chamber... holds that there is sufficient evidence that (1) there existed a
joint criminal enterprise"), with InternationalLaw in Brief: InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (Trial Chamber Ill): Prosecutor v. Milogevit, supra note 191
("[Tihe Trial Chamber held: (1) there was sufficient evidence of a joint criminal
enterprise").
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represents aggressive spin, because at the time-a mere week or so
after the Decision-the authors surely expected that the trial
would continue. Still, the language is there-or rather, not thereand at the very least, we recognize bad drafting and laziness, in the
otherwise cautious, dry language of an ILM summary, and perhaps
a kind of conceptual heuristic.1 9 3 At the time, the Decision predictably receded into the background, as its most consequential element-the continuation of the trial on all counts-took clear
precedence. This linguistic and conceptual shortcut-which rendered "sufficient evidence" without the chamber's own more cautious definitional qualifier, allowing a reading vindicating the
prosecution's case-would reappear in the discourse after the
Decision re-emerged.
V.

THE POTENTIAL OF AMBIGUITY: INVOKING THE DECISION
AFTER MILOSEVICs DEATH

On March 11, 2006, Milogevic died, and, within days, proceedings were terminated. 9 4 With his death the interim Decision,
whose formal function had already been perfected in the redefined, redlined contours of the defense stage, unexpectedly
became the chamber's last significant utterance on the evidence.
A document whose continuing significance, apart from defining
the scope of other Rule 98bis hearings, would ordinarily be superseded by final judgment, suddenly regained a potential prominence in the vacuum of frustrating indecision and inarticulation.
For some, it became a kind of judgment.
Different actors have deployed a variety of strategies for exploiting the Decision's potential for meaning and authority. In general,
these strategies treat the discussion in the Decision as dispositive of
some question, though they do so in very different ways. In some
strategies, this involves careful mining of dicta; for example, by citing the chamber's discussion of a legal standard it used to assess
the evidence; elsewhere, following the approach seen when the
193. There was certainly no reason descriptions had to be skewed this way. Human
Rights Watch's review of the terminated case produced an admirably accurate summary of
the Decision, noting that it preserved each count based on evidence that "if accepted, and
in the absence of a defense case, a reasonable trier of fact could find sufficient to sustain a
conviction," but also that there was not enough evidence to sustain "all of the factual allegations relating to all of the crime scenes included in the indictments." HUM. RTS. WATCH,
supra note 64, at 13.
194. Prosecutor v. Milogevie, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order Terminating the Proceedings,
at 2 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 14, 2006), available at http://www.
icty.org/x/cases/slobodanmilosevic/tord/en/060314.htm.
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Decision was first issued, the cautionary qualifier to the phrase "sufficient evidence" is read out, implying that the evidence actually
was sufficient. These approaches, to which we first turn, either
advance a claim of quasi-judgment or make arguments for redeploying Milogevic's "sufficient evidence" in other legal contexts.
Logic and doctrine tell us that, except where it acquits, the Decision has no dispositive or authoritative value whatsoever. Not all
who read and write are logical or exacting about doctrine, however, and a realist, or realistic, assessment of the Decision's effects
must take into account uses that are compelling, even if not up to
code. 195 The uses to which the Decision has been put suggest
there is marginally more scope for deploying its characterizations
of the state of the law than its descriptions of factual evidence, but
even the latter is available. The Decision's deployment in other
cases, and by other courts, however doctrinally suspect, is its own
proof of influence. Still, the evident doctrinal weakness of these
uses exercises its own constraint on the Decision's utility as an
ersatz judgment. Normally, realism encourages skepticism towards
doctrine and "correct" answers, but here we see how doctrine constrains the uses for which the Decision can be plausibly deployed;
not just any argument will do.
A.

Characterizingthe Decision as JudgmentDel Ponte's Press Conference

In her press statement following Milogevic's death, Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte expressly invoked the Decision in the context of a mountain of evidence and a nearly completed trial:
I deeply regret the death of Slobodan Milosevic. It deprives the
victims of the justice they need and deserve. ... During the
prosecution case, 295 witnesses testified and 5000 exhibits were
presented to the court. This represents a wealth of evidence
that is on the record. After the presentation of the prosecution
case, the Trial Chamber, on 16 June 2004, rejected a defense
motion to dismiss the charges for lack of evidence, thereby confirming, in accordance with Rule 98bs, that the prosecution case
contains sufficient evidence capable of supporting a conviction
on all 66 counts. The Defense was given the same amount of
195. Richard A. Matasar, Treatise Writing And FederalJurisdictionScholarship:Does Doctrine
Matter When Law Is Politics?,89 MIcH. L. R.Ev. 1499, 1508 n.30 (1991) ("[R]ealist legal analysis recognizes multiple possible answers to legal problems. From deciding what a case
means, to understanding the factual content of either a dispute or the precedents that
might govern that dispute... legal analysts must exercise judgment.... [R]ealists seek to
explain the development of law through many external factors-political, cultural,
ideological.").
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time as the prosecution to present its case. There were in total
466 hearing days. 4 hours a day. Only 40 hours were left in the
the trial was likely to be completed by the end
and
Defense case, 19
6
of the spring.

Almost everything here is accurate; 197 the fact of the trial's termination is not hidden. 198 The statement is also presented from a
perspective and for a purpose, and in that context, the Decision
acquires an aura of considerably greater finality on March 12, 2006
than presumably even Del Ponte would have assigned it just the
morning before, let alone when it was issued. The claim that the
trial was nearly over, besides heightening the poignancy and sense
of waste, also asserts a finality near to final judgment. Everything
needed was available-just a few hours were missing. This is a halftruth: "40 hours" did not count time for cross-examination or
administration, let alone delays, and at the rate things had been
going, the trial would have continued for a few months, after which
there would have been a delay of six months to a year for the final
judgment to be issued, at any point during which his death would
have terminated proceedings; and, of course, presumably both
sides would have appealed. 19 9 Yet what is interesting is the implication: conclusion and judgment were so near that it is possible for
observers to draw their own opinion from the trial process. 20 0 Del
196.

Press Conference of the ICTY Prosecutor,WAR CRIMES PROSECUTION WATCH (Mar. 12,

2006), http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/warcrimeswatch/archives/wcpw_vol 1issue
03.html.
197. It was not the defense, but the amici, who brought the motion; nor did they press
for acquittal on "the charges," but only certain counts. See supra Part II.B. This may be
simply a slip-and an understandable one, in light of the subsequent appointment of the
amici as defense counsel-though the prosecution's opposition to MilogeviCs self-representation was endemic, and there is at least inadvertent advantage in suggesting that Milogevie
had brought the motion and been rejected. With this slip or elision, the imperfect identity
of the amici and Milogevit-with all it implies for the value of the Decision in an adversarial
system-disappears.
a great pity for justice that the trial will not be
198. Thus, Del Ponte continued: "It's
completed and no verdict will be rendered." Press Conference of the ICTY Prosecutor, supra
note 196; cf Simons & Crouch, supra note 68 ("Ms. Hartmann, Ms. Del Ponte's spokeswoman, expressed frustration that at least in a legal sense, Mr. Milosevic would not go down
in history as a convicted war criminal. 'This is bad for proving the real responsibility of Mr.
Milosevic,' she said. 'There is a presumption of innocence, and now we will not get a
conviction.'").
199. See Boas, supra note 14, at I ("[Diespite ex post facto statements by the prosecution
that its end was only weeks away, in reality it was some months away from being concluded,
and yet many more months from a judgement being rendered.").
200. See Naqvi, supra note 29, at 247 ("[T]he lack of ajudgment has not deprived the
four-year trial from achieving some of its objectives, in particular that of satisfying to some
extent the right to the truth or setting down a historical record. The question that remains
is whether a legal judgment is necessary to accord such evidence the status of representing
'the truth.'").
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Ponte simultaneously acknowledges what she must-that technically there will be no verdict-and claims that nonetheless there
20 1
can be.
Considering the prosecution's earlier, assiduous efforts to
render the Decision as invisible and inconsequential as possible, its
very public invocation by the chief prosecutor in the wake of the
trial's termination is ironic. More, however, it suggests the prosecution understood the strategic possibilities inherent in the document-certainly the Decision's potential to lend an ersatz air of
finality, and perhaps also, if only implicitly, its attractive potential
to do the things final judgments are thought to do in constructing
narratives-even as it too understood, and was compelled to
acknowledge the Decision's doctrinal limitations.
B.

Treating the Decision like a Judgment-The ICJ's
Bosnian Genocide Case

Just under a year after the death of Milogevic, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) rendered its judgment in the genocide case
brought by Bosnia against Serbia and Montenegro. 20 2 In part, this
case had acquired an even greater emotional and political salience
as an implicit second chance to demonstrate Milogevic's responsibility. Thus, when the ICJ ruled that Serbia had not committed
genocide, 20 3 its failure to acquire and consider all the evidence
201. The tribunal, by contrast, was cautious in its response to Milogevi's death, neither
mentioning the Decision nor advancing it as substantive alternative to judgment. Yet, it,
too, sought to place the termination of the case in a broader context that implicitly emphasized its continuing availability as a venue for an accounting of the broader conflict:
I would like to restate that the Tribunal regrets Slobodan Milosevic's death and
the fact that the case against him will not be brought tojudgement. We recognize
that this case was an important one. However, it is not the only important case
that the Tribunal's judges have before them. We continue to try the highest-level
persons accused of perpetrating the most serious crimes against Serb, Croat, Bosnian Muslim, Albanian and other victims in the former Yugoslavia.
Press Release, Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Update from the President on the Death of Slobodan Milosevic (Mar. 17, 2006). The President at the time was
Judge Pocar.
202. See Application of Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 91 (Feb. 26),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf. The identities of the states
party have a complicated history. The Applicant, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
became Bosnia and Herzegovina on December 14, 1995. The Respondent, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, became the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro on February 4,
2003; after the dissolution of that union on June 3, 2006, Montenegro was no longer a
party to the case, leaving only the Republic of Serbia. See id.
76-77.
203. See id. 1 413-15. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) did find that Serbia
had violated its obligations under the Genocide Convention by failing to prevent the genocide in Srebrenica inJuly 1995, having failed to transfer Ratko Mladit for trial by the ICTY,
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from Miloevic-in particular, the minutes of the FRYs Supreme
Defense Council, thought to be a potential smoking gun for proving the senior Belgrade leadership's special intent and knowledge-became a focus for frustration. 2 4 Although an
independent court, the ICJ acknowledged the "unusual feature"
that "[m] any of the allegations before this Court have already been
the subject of the processes and decisions of the ICTY." 20 5 But
what, if anything, could the ICJ have done with the Miloevic chamber's review of evidence in the Decision?
Although not a criminal jurisdiction, the ICJ applied a standard
of proof of similar seriousness: "claims against a State involving
charges of exceptional gravity must be proved by evidence that is
fully conclusive."206 In its judgment, the ICJ considers at length the
and having failed fully to cooperate with the tribunal. See id. 471. The ICJ identifies the
perpetrators of genocide at Srebrenica as "members of the VRS [ Vojska Republike Srpske, the
Bosnian Serb Army], id. 1 297, which is all consistent with the ICTY's jurisprudence.
204. See, e.g., Jens David Ohlin, A Meta-Theory of InternationalCriminalProcedure: Vindicating the Rule of Law, 14 UCLAJ. INT'L L. & FOREIGN Arr. 77, 98 (2009) ("The story [concerning the Supreme Defense Counsel documents] highlights perfectly the complex tensions
between the collective truth of history and the individual truth of a single defendant's
culpability."); Marlise Simons, Genocide Court Ruled for Serbia Without Seeing Full War Archive,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/09/world/europe/09
archives.html ("Lawyers interviewed in The Hague and Belgrade said that the outcome
might well have been different had the International Court of Justice pressed for access to
the full archives, and legal scholars and human rights groups said it was deeply troubling
that the judges did not subpoena the documents directly from Serbia."); Ruth Wedgwood,
Slobodan Milosevic's Last Waltz, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2007, ("[I]n trying to meet [its evidentiary] standard, the court declines to draw any adverse inference against Belgrade, even
though the documents it turned over to the court were heavily redacted.").
205. Application of Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
2007 I.C.J. 91,
212.
206. Id. 1 209 (comparing Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 244 (Apr. 9)). The
ICJ's standard was controversial. See Berglind Halld6rsd6ttir Birkland, Reining in Non-State
Actors: State Responsibility and Attribution in Cases of Genocide, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1641-42
(2009) ("While the Court's imposition of this onerous standard of proof was driven by the
commendable desire not to take genocide lightly, it is important to remember that state
responsibility under the Genocide Convention... is civil, not criminal, in nature.... This
onerous standard-when combined with a strict attribution test and a refusal to consider
circumstantial evidence of intent-raised the threshold high enough effectively to shut the
door on most complaints under the Genocide Convention."); Theodor Meron, Breaking
Developments in InternationalLaw: A Conversation on the ICJ's Opinion in Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, 101 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 215, 216 (2007) ("This
sounds a lot to me like the reasonable doubt standard and the requirement that guilt be
the only reasonable inference from the facts ....
The ICJ's decision to apply such a high
standard of proof is noteworthy. Because of the egregious criminality of genocide and the
serious implications of a determination that the state is responsible for genocide, it is perhaps reasonable for the court to apply standards of proof that are rather higher than the
normal standard of balance of probabilities. But, should the court apply standards as high
as in a criminal case?... One of the problems here is that the court has no provision in
the Statute or Rules on the burden of proof and its shaping of evidential rules as it goes
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value of evidence from ICTY cases, as well as the jurisprudence of
the ICTY itself.20 7 It considers the ICTY's "fact-finding process" to
be of the kind that "falls within [its preferred] formulation, as 'evidence obtained by examination of persons directly involved,'
tested by cross-examination, the credibility of which has not been
' 20 8
challenged subsequently."
The parties to Bosnian Genocide were in broad, if strategic, agreement on the value of the ICTY. The Applicant, Bosnia, had relied
on ICTY material throughout the proceedings, introducing evidence from a variety of documents, including indictments-a strategy consistent with a broader view of probative value than the ICJ
seemed prepared to accept. 20 9 The Respondent, Serbia, had at
first, "challenged the reliability of the Tribunal's findings, the adequacy of the legal framework under which it operates, the adequacy of its procedures and its neutrality" 2 1 0-a view similar to
Milogevic's. By the time oral proceedings were held, however, Serbia had adopted an approach closer to that of a cooperating
defense attorney or amicus, it accepted the jurisprudence of the
ICTY, but noted:
[W]e do not regard all the material of the [ICTY] as having the
same relevance or probative value. We have primarily based
ourselves upon the judgments of the Tribunal's Trial and
Appeals Chambers, given that only the judgments can be
regarded
as establishing the facts about the crimes in a credible
1
way.

21

The ICJ then expressly discusses the evidentiary value of Rule
98bis decisions. 2 12 The ICJ accurately paraphrases the Jelisic (and
R. v. Galbraith) standard that such decisions only mean a court
could convict, not that it would, and notes that, in Krajiknik, the
chamber ultimately acquitted on genocide after having dismissed a
Rule 98bis motion. 213 The ICJ then draws the critical conclusion,
along with a particular case does not give parties advance notice as to what is expected of
them.").
207. Application of Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,

2007 I.CJ. 91,
214-24.
208. Id. 214.
209. Id. 217.
210. Id. 215.
211. Id. 1 215. The ICJ implies that Serbia's shift was strategic, taken because the ICTY
had yielded only limited convictions for genocide, and had not convicted any Belgrade
officials. Id.
212. Id. 219 (calling them "motions for acquittal made by the defence ... after the
defence has had the opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses"). Note the
reference to motions brought by "the defence," rather than, as in Milogevie, an amicus.
213. Id.
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which is equally valid for indictments and Rule 98bis decisions:
"Because the judge or the Chamber does not make definitive findings.., the Court does not consider that it can give weight to those
rulings. The standard of proof which the Court requires in this
case would not be met."214 The ICJ accepted Serbia's position
rather than Bosnia's in holding that evidence from the ICTY is not
enough, and interim evaluations are not enough; only final judg2 15
ments are definitive.
Having set the bar high, the ICJ promptly limbos under it, and
cites the Decision several times. In deciding if members of a group
protected under the Genocide Convention were killed, in regard
to the Luka Camp, the ICJ says the following:
In the Milo~eviW Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal,
the Trial Chamber found that many Muslims were detained in
Luka camp in May and June 1992 and that many killings were
observed by witnesses, it held that "[tihe conditions and treatment to which the detainees at Luka Camp were subjected were
terrible and included regular beatings, rapes, and killings." "At
Luka Camp . . . The witness personally moved about [twelve to

fifteen] bodies and saw approximately 100 bodies stacked up
like firewood at Luka Camp; each day a refrigerated meat truck
from the local Bimeks2 16
Company in Broko would come to take
away the dead bodies.
Three paragraphs later, they reach their finding:
On the basis of the facts set out above, the Court finds that it is
established by overwhelming evidence that massive killings in
specific areas and detention camps throughout the territory of
Bosnia... were perpetrated during the conflict.... The Court
thus finds that it has been established by conclusive evidence
that massive killings of members of the protected group
occurred and that therefore
the requirements of the material
2 17
element ...

are fulfilled.

Similarly, the ICJ invokes the Decision to discuss the Manjaca
Camp in deciding if Serbia "caus[ed] 'bodily or mental harm'
2 18
within the meaning of the Convention."
214. Id. Groome suggests that a final judgment in Milosevie would have been dispositive, see Groome, supra note 155, at 964, though the ICJ itself never adopts this view, calling
such a judgment only persuasive.
215. Application of Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
2007 I.C.J. 91,
219.
216. Id. 273 (citing Prosecutor v. Milogevie, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion
forJudgment of Acquittal,
159, 161 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former YugoslaviaJune 16,
2004)).
217. Id. 276.
218. Id.
304, 315-16.
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These two camps were hardly the only evidence the ICJ considered, and even for them, other evidence was adduced that did not
rely on a "non-definitive finding." It is the fact that the ICJ'sjudges
used the Decision's reference to these camps at all, however, and
precisely in this pedestrian way, that is of note. Surrounding the
ICJ's citation of the Decision's Luka Camp review are citations to
judgments in Brdanin,Krnojelac, Stakic, Nikolic, Sikirica, andJelisic, as
well as the report of the Commission of Experts and General
Assembly and Security Council resolutions. 21 9 The ICJ treats the
evidence in the Decision exactly as it does final judgments, acting
as if the Miloevic chamber had accepted the truth of testimony it
cited, whereas the chamber had specifically refused to evaluate evidence with the finality upon which another court might rely. To
the degree the ICJ's finding "by overwhelming evidence" is built
upon the Decision, it misreads and overreaches, but also grants a
retrospective authority to the Decision.
Moreover, the ICJ was perfectly capable of reaching back into
the Milogevic case itself, to evaluate pieces of evidence on their own
merits when it wished-its concerns about conclusiveness notwithstanding. In the most decisive such instance, the ICJ reaches
directly back for testimony from the trial:
The Applicant has drawn attention to certain evidence given by
General Wesley Clark before the ICTY in the MiloSevie case. General Clark referred to a conversation that he had had with
Milogevit during the negotiation of the Dayton Agreement. He
stated that
"I went to MilogeviC and I asked him. I said, 'If you have so
much influence over these [Bosnian] Serbs, how could you
have allowed General Mladie to have killed all those people
at Srebrenica?' And he looked to me - at me. His expression was very grave. He paused before he answered, and he
said, 'Well, General Clark, I warned him not to do this, but
he didn't listen to me.' And it was in the context of all of
the publicity at the time about the Srebrenica massacre."
General Clark gave it as his opinion, in his evidence before the
ICTY, that the circumstances indicated that Milogevie had foreknowledge of what was to be "a military operation with a massacre." The ICTY record shows that Milogevit denied ever making
the statement to which General Clark referred, but the Trial
Chamber nevertheless relied on General Clark's testimony in its
2004 when rejecting the Motion for JudgDecision of 16 June
ment of Acquittal. 220
274, 254, 258, 261, 263, 266, 268, 252, 266, 271-72, 274-75.
219. Id.
220. Id. 1 437 (citing Miloevic, Transcript for Dec. 16, 2003, at 30494-30495, 30497;
and Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 1 280).
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The ICTY "relied on General Clark's testimony" only in the technical sense that it did discuss it in the Decision, but it is a clear
misreading of the Decision and the Rule 98bis process to say that
the chamber "relied" on Clark's testimony in any definitive sense;
the ICTY's judges were obliged to assume the credibility and reliability of the prosecution's evidence, whether or not they themselves
actually believed it. Here, however, the ICJ is assuming that testimony from Milosevic has probative value because it has been laun221
dered through the Decision.
The ICJ first announces a strict and skeptical standard forbidding reliance on anything but final judgments, but then relies
heavily on Rule 98bis decisions, 222 as well as underlying evidence
that fails to meet its own standards. In a way, it is a formalistic
game: the ICJ could cure the defects in its discussion of the Decision simply by considering the underlying evidence as its own,
rather than as a derivative product of another court; it could have
simply asked itself what it thought Clark's statement meant, or
heard Clark directly as a witness. 223 But this solution merely
returns us to the theme that evidence either has intrinsic value or
not, but acquires none through the trial process unless and until
that process characterizes it in some definitive way. The ICJ standard confirms precisely to that logic, which it then fails to follow. 224

221. Bosnian Genocide also considers expert reports and other testimony from Milofevi.
These include reports by Andrds Riedlmayer on the destruction of cultural heritage, id. 11
339-43 ("Mr. Riedlmayer's findings do constitute persuasive evidence as to the destruction
of historical, cultural and religious heritage in Bosnia."), Robert Donia, on Serbian geopolitical aims, id. 371, as well as testimony by Lord Owen and the Deputy Commander of
Dutchbat proffered by Serbia, id. 412 (noting, however, that the testimony "does not
establish a factual basis for finding the Respondent responsible on a basis of direction or
control").
222. The ICJ also discusses the test for the motion of acquittal from Jelisi6and the Rule
98bis decision in Krajis'nik See id. 1 219.
223. See Rules of Court art. 62, 1989 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. No. 5, at 133.
224. In turn, Bosnian Genocide itself was followed: the International Criminal Court
relied on the ICJ case in rejecting genocide charges for President Omar Al Bashir of
Sudan, "observ[ing] that a similar approach has recently been taken by the ICJ in its Judgment on Genocide," listing several examples from Bosnian Genocide, and citing to the same
conclusions that rely in part on the Decision's discussion of Luka Camp. See Prosecutor v.
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Public Redacted Version,
Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir, 1 194 & n.221 (Mar. 4, 2009), overturned on other grounds, Case No. ICC02/05-01/09-OA, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the "Decision on the
Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir,"
at 3 (Feb. 3, 2010).
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The Obligation of Possibility-Academic Critique
of the ICJJudgment

The ICJ judgment was widely criticized, in part for its failure to
consider more rigorously the evidence from ICTY trials and, in particular, the Supreme Defense Council transcripts. 225 In a recent
article, a former ICTY prosecutor, Dermot Groome, offers a searching critique of the ICJ's use of evidence from Miloevi. 226 Rather
than criticizing the ICJ's doctrinal deviance, however, Groome's
critique is premised on the significance of the Decision, and demonstrates the creative use to which the Decision's "sufficient evidence" standard can be put, even as it, quite correctly, reaffirms
the limits that standard imposes on creative repurposing.
"[G]iven the parity between the central issues of [Milofevic and
Bosnian Genocide]," Groome argues that "the [Decision] merits
close attention for what it says about the evidence of genocide and
22 7
the relationship of Serbia to the crimes committed in Bosnia."
He reviews the evidence considered in the Decision-evidence of
Milogevic's role as the pivotal figure in Serbian politics; Milogevic's
own statements showing his control; his consequential negotiations
with foreign interlocutors; his control of armed forces in the various theaters; the logistical support provided by Serbia to Serbs in
Bosnia and Croatia; evidence that Bosnian Serb officers were paid
by Belgrade until 2002; evidence of joint planning between the
various Serb armies; and evidence that Milogevic made assiduous

225. See, e.g., Marko Milanovic, State Responsibility for Genocide: A Follow-Up, 18 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 669, 678 (2007) ("If the Court had indeed ordered Serbia to produce the documents, Serbia would likely have complied, as there were no objective reasons for making
them available to the ICTY and not to the ICJ. Even though the ICJ, unlike the ICTY,
possesses no subpoena power, if Serbia had failed to abide by the Court's order, it would
have had to suffer the consequences, since the Court would have been able to have much
greater recourse to inferences in order to establish Serbia's knowledge of the genocide.");
Susana SdCouto, Reflections on theJudgment of the InternationalCourt ofJustice in Bosnia's Genocide Case Against Serbia and Montenegro, 15 HUM. RTs. BRIEF 2, 4 (2007) ("The Court's failure
to consider the evidence in a holistic or collective manner is disconcerting, particularly in
light of the fact that, as mentioned earlier, the Court also refused to draw any conclusions
from Serbia's failure to turn over unedited copies of the Supreme Defence Council documents."). But see C. F. Amerasinghe, The Bosnia Genocide Case, 21 LEIDENJ. INT'L L. 411, 428
(2008) (characterizing the ICJ's approach to evidence as "liberal" and describing the case's
significant and positive contribution to international law); Birkland, supra note 206, at
1649 (giving a positive reading of Bosnian Genocide's broad interpretation of the obligation
to prevent genocide).
226. See generally Groome, supra note 155.
227.

Id. at 965.
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demands to be kept informed of events in Bosnia. 228 Completing
his survey, Groome concludes:
While this determination by the trial chamber carries none of
the weight of a final judgment regarding the evidence, it does
indicate that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable trial
chamber to potentially convict Milogevik of genocide. Given the
similarity between the issues in the Milogevit case and Bosnia's
claim of genocide before the ICJ,
this body of evidence had simi229
lar potential for the ICJ case.
This is technically accurate-evidence was available that the
ICTY Trial Chamber had not deemed obviously insufficient. The
Decision indicates, in other words, that some other reasonable
court, like the ICJ, could find the evidence sufficient for conviction. The ICJ chose to examine some evidence, though only a
small amount and that haphazardly. For Groome, this is not
enough; the "reasonable possibility" of review implies an
imperative:
[T] he ICJ decided to place no reliance on the findings of the
Milogevie trial chamber in its [Decision]. However, given the
Milogevie trial chamber's finding that there was sufficient evidence upon which a court could find Milogevi6 guilty of the
crime of genocide, and given the parity between the Milogevit
case and the ICJ case, a thorough inquiry into Bosnia's claims
before the ICJ required the ICJ to examine the evidence
referred to in the [Decision] to adjudicate the case before it.230
This is a possibilitative argument-that a thing is necessary
merely because it is possible. Note the use of the word
"required"-because some court could find this evidence sufficient, this court must review it.231 This is, in other words, an
attempt to make the interim Decision-in light of the subsequent
lack of final judgment-into a mandatory writ for another review.
Groome is an accomplished lawyer, and admits what he must about
the Decision; his desire to deploy it leads him to adopt an essentially procedural move - indeed, the valence created by the Decision's doctrinal structure really left no other option. It is true that a
full acquittal at the Rule 98bis phase would have been an authoritative moment of interpretation; its own denials notwithstanding, the
ICJ would have been hard-pressed to find Serbia at fault in the face
228.

Id. at 967-74.

229. Id. at 974-75.
230. Id. at 975.
231. See id. (noting that the possibility of a broader JCE finding in the Decision makes
such a review "all the more compulsory").

The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev.

[Vol. 42

of a preemptory acquittal of Serbia's leader. 23 2 Yet the opposite
outcome-continuation of the trial-does not yield an equal obligation in the opposite direction, nor an equally authoritative
interpretation.
D.

ExtractingAuthority from the Decision-The Rio Conference Report

The judges who wrote the Decision were concerned not only
with the consequences for Milokevic, but with the broader institutional effects of the Rule 98bis process. One way of reading the
Decision, and one use for it, is as an influence on ICL's developing
jurisprudence. A conference of the International Law Association
(ILA) illustrates how one can extract authoritative text from the
Decision to advance claims about the law; but equally, the ILA's
efforts suggest important limits on how much one might do with a
terminated trial.
The ILA Conference Report, which is concerned with the rules
for the use of force, relies on the Decision in formulating its definition of armed conflict. 2 33 The Report notes that the Decision
favors the broader approach taken in Tadic over the more restrictive view in the ICRC Official Commentary to Common Article 3,
while also declaring that the two are not inconsistent 234 -a consequential difference for how broadly or narrowly the scope of international humanitarian law is applied. The point is that the Report
builds its case with citation to the Decision, without any need to
mention its interim nature.
Where the Milo~evicjudges are discussing legal tests, they often
speak in their own voice, and the strictures of Rule 98bis evidently
relax. Thus, in the Decision's discussion of the test for armed conflict, after initially noting the amici's contention that there was no
evidence of armed conflict in Kosovo before March 24, 1999, the
chamber proceeds to a discussion of the existing law and the tribunal's jurisprudence for seven paragraphs, during which a single
232. Id. at 964. To the degree the ICJ's standard of proof actually is lower than for
criminal trials, it would still be possible for it to find against Serbia after criminal acquittal,
just as a civil trial's "balance of probabilities" is not precluded by prior criminal acquittal.

PETER MURPHY, MURPHY ON EVIDENCE 108 (8th ed. 2003) (describing the common law
approach); see aISoJULIANE KOKOTr, THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAw 18-21 (1998) (comparing German and American standards of

proof in civil and criminal law). See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Emily Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards of Proof 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 243 (2002) (comparing civilian and
common law standards in civil trials).
233. See INT'L LAw ASs'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE MEANING OF ARMED CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 10-11 (2010).
234. Id. at 14-15.
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mention is made of views advanced by the prosecution and the
amici, and none of any evidence led or challenged. 23 5 The analysis
is not couched in the hypothetical, tentative language of what a
trial chamber might decide; instead, "[i] t is settled in the International Tribunal's jurisprudence," "[t]he Trial Chamber makes the
following observations on the Tadic test" and so forth. 2 36 This is
the most confident language in the Decision; other Rule 98bis decisions display a similar confidence when deciding legal tests, as
237
opposed to weighing evidence.
Other sections of the Decision demonstrate a similar pattern. In
the discussion of deportation and forcible transfer, 23 8 there are
more mentions of the prosecution and amici positions, in part
because they substantively disagree about the correct legal characterization of the crimes, but the overall tenor is the same-the
chamber is speaking in its own voice. 239 Likewise, in discussing the
proper mens rea for genocide, the Decision notes the amici's contention that the mens rea for genocide cannot be reconciled with the
mens rea for command responsibility, but then says that "[] n the
basis of the Decision of the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v.
Brdanin, this submission is unmeritorious." 240 Here, the chamber
is not simply considering the possibility that the prosecution's preferred rule could be applied by a reasonable judge; instead, the
chamber is decisively dismissing the amici's view as a matter of
law-a clear decision "on the merits."
Consequently, this is also the most authoritative form of reliance
on the Decision. The ILA's reliance on the Decision as an expres235. See Prosecutor v. Milogevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judge15 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 16, 2004), availament of Acquittal,
ble at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan.milosevic/tdec/en/040616.htm ("Both the
Prosecution and the Amici Curiae agree as to the requirement of an armed conflict for
Articles 3 and 5 of the Statute."). This is a profoundly uncontroversial point, and this may
be just a convenient way for the Chamber to note that.
236. Id. 1 15, 18.
237. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Decision on Rule 98bis Motion
for Judgment of Acquittal, 1 107 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslovia Oct. 31,
2002) ("Moreover, the Trial Chamber observes that it derives from the very nature of the
act of instigation and the fundamental requirement of causation, that a concrete person or
group of persons prompted has not already, and independently from the instigator,
formed an intent to commit the crime in question (omnimodo facturus). Therefore, it
would have been part of the Prosecutor's burden of proof to demonstrate that the principal perpetrator of the crime was not already dedicated to its commission, and, as such
should have been pleaded in the Indictment.").
238. Milofevi, Decision on Motion for Judgement of Acquittal 1 41-82.
239. And at much greater length-the Chamber discusses the cross-border element of
deportation for over twenty paragraphs. Id. 11 47-69.
240. Id. 1 300. There are many examples throughout the Decision.
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sion of the law seems supportable because in actuality, the chamber is expressing its own view. 241 Of course, where the Decision is
most authoritative is also where it is most anodyne, regurgitating
legal standards with long pedigrees in other cases. In its discussion
of mens rea, for example, the chamber dismisses the amici by citing
Brdanin,242 and this is typical. 243 As we have seen, the Decision's
discussion of the Rule 98bis standard of review is itself derivative of
Jelisic, Tadic, and ultimately R v. Galbraith.
It is not always this way. We have seen how the chamber used the
Decision to "clarify" the bases for applying Jelisic's Rule 98bis sufficiency test, for example, and, logically, Rule 98bis decisions are the
best place to affect the law on how Rule 98bis decisions are made.
Certainly an assertive court could use a Rule 98bis decision to
advance a judicially constructed rule as well as it could use any
other document, in which case scholars and practitioners would be
well-advised to consider a decision's actual impact, whatever the
formal, doctrinal constraints.
Yet even with this caveat, the Decision's authority is greatest
where it is least engaged with the evidence-which is to say, with
the putative purpose of the entire exercise. The chamber's authoritative capacity to advance the law is as great here in the Decision as
in any document, including a final judgment, 244 but only on a circumscribed set of legal and procedural issues that, structurally, do
not reach to the question of individual guilt or innocence, let
alone to questions of shared narrative. The authoritative narrative
theory relies, in significant part, on the procedural integrity of the
trial process to claim its special power, but this does not mean it is
241. As to the substance of this view, see Grant Dawson & Rachel Boynton, Reconciling
Complicity in Genocide andAiding and Abetting Genocide in theJurisprudenceof the United Nations
Ad Hoc Tribunals, 21 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 241, 267-74 (2008) (describing the impact of
Rule 98bis decisions in Staki6 and Milofevie on the distinction between complicity in and
aiding and abetting genocide).
242. Milo~evie, Decision on Motion for Judgement of Acquittal
300.
243. See, e.g., id. 25 ("On the basis of this evidence, the Trial Chamber is satisfied
that the conflict in Kosovo meets the first element of the Tadit test."); id. 291 ("The
Appeals Chamber in Prosecutorv. Brdanin held that there is no incompatibility between the
requirement of genocide and the mens rea requirement for a conviction pursuant to the
third category ofjoint criminal enterprise; it is therefore not necessary for the Prosecution
to prove that the Accused possessed the required intent for genocide before a conviction
can be entered on this basis of liability."); id. 295 ("The Trial Chamber observes that the
Appeal Chamber's conclusion that the proper characterization of Krstic's liability is aiding
and abetting is confined to the facts of that case.").
244. The value of the Decision may have been increased by a temporary circumstance:
The ILA report, produced in 2008, could not rely on the still ongoing MOS trial; it is
possible that the final judgment in that case would have exercised a displacing effect.
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concerned only with process-in the end, the theory rises, or falls,
on the stories it can tell about what happened, and what it meant.
These are claims about the substance of judgment.
E.

Doctrine's Constraint-TheDecision's Structural Inadequacy

The post mortem deployments of the Decision have been limited
and cautious. There are few extravagant or tendentious claims for
its probative value or its authority. Some actors have tried to mobilize the Decision as a kind of ersatz judgment, but these efforts feel
half-hearted, because they are seriously limited by the doctrinal
straitjacket Rule 98bis creates; even the most ambitious advocates
are compelled to acknowledge that the Decision is not a verdict.
For anyone who has ever felt the pull of the most skeptical, critical
views of law-that nothing drives legal analysis other than actors'
preferences-the Decision's restrained deployment is a bracing
riposte, a reminder that text, process and doctrine matter. The
very fact of this restraint, this non-use-especially by actors with
evident convictions about Milogevic's guilt-suggests the limited
utility of anything other than final judgment in constructing claims
that rest on judicial authority.
In particular, there is a notable absence of claims that the Decision-really, the Miloevic trial in general-has contributed to the
construction of an authoritative narrative, despite its early promise
and the hopes ringed round what was, when it began, the most
important of the ICTY's trials. That advocates of the authoritative
narrative school did not pick up the Decision and make more of it
suggests they did not think it would advance their advocacy goals.
Either they were uncomfortable with its specifics-concerned, in
other words, that it might point towards acquittal 245-or they recognized that this less-than-judgment was structurally inadequate.
If a trial reaches final judgment, no one is terribly concerned
with earlier interim decisions; it is only when a trial is terminated
that a prior interim decision potentially assumes greater importance. This suggests a mismatch between an interim judgment's
initial design and its deployment after a case. The Decision was
designed to serve a specific purpose in the middle of the trial; it
was not designed to bear the load of final judgment, and deploying
245. As noted, commentators supposed that the prosecution's case was not going well.
This suggests a curious feature of the authoritative narrative theory, and indeed of claims
that ICL promotes reconciliation more broadly-the implicit assumption that the narrative
will and should be one of guilt and conviction. Acquittal is not the point of ICL-as-reconciliation, even though, in theory, that should be equally efficacious.
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it for that purpose would stress the unfinished edifice. Logically,
this is true for any document, work or decision produced in the
course of a trial that is subsequently ended before judgment, apart
from those that have an internal finality (such as adjudications
about points of procedure), including all the substantive evaluations of fact upon which the authoritative narrative theory principally relies.2 46 Formal, legal authority may or may not do what its
advocates claim; in terminated trials, it surely cannot.
For what does rejection of a claim under Rule 98bis mean? What
does it indicate about the shape of the law? Accepting a motion to
acquit is consequential: if the chamber had sided with the amici on
a point of law-for example, finding that no international armed
conflict existed prior to March 24, 1999, and that a suite of charges
would therefore have to be dropped-this would have had an
undeniable impact on the development of the law and provided
confident guides to the contours of jurisprudence. Points on
which the evidence was in fact deemed lacking can be profitably
studied to determine what constitutes an obviously insufficient
argument.
Yet rejecting a motion to acquit does not have an equally unambiguous impact. Perhaps, if a chamber were to reject a motion in
particularly emphatic terms-saying, in effect, that no reasonable
trier could not convict or that no one could accept the defense (or
amicus) interpretation-that might constitute a clear indicium. Yet
anything less-anything that merely proceeds along the doctrinally
established path for Rule 98bis review-tells us almost nothing.
246. Indeed, any element of the trial process prior to final judgment might theoretically be invoked in this way - the mere fact of arrest and indictment can hang over a
defendant long after his acquittal. Rule 98bis decisions are not the only documents that
occupy this ambiguous space - any interim decision might be invoked following the abrupt
termination of a trial - nor is this limited to the ICTY: Proceedings to confirm charges at
the International Criminal Court are preliminary and are not binding on the sitting trial
chamber, but they can have consequential effects and law-making functions. In Lubanga,
for example, the pre-trial chamber discusses the question of whether the conflict at issue
was internal or international, and both examines the Prosecution's evidence and advances
its own interpretation. See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/
06, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 1 200-37 (Jan. 29, 2007). If Lubanga or
another of the ICC's cases was subsequently terminated prior to final judgment, it is conceivable that the confirmation stage could be invoked, as the Decision was by the Del
Ponte, to suggest some measure of official review. However, indictments and confirmation
hearings also have an even lower evidentiary threshold, making them even more limited,
doctrinally, than the Decision. Cf Freeland, supra note 106, at 135 (noting that "the standard applied by the tribunal [in Rule 98bis decisions] appears to be of a higher threshold
than with the confirmation of an indictment."). To date there is little evidence that any
interim decision at the ICC has been invoked to advance claims of guilt, whether in its
ongoing cases or in the two cases in which the defendant has died.
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Apart from its discussions of legal standards, not a single piece of
factual evidence deployed in the Decision can be confidently
assigned a definitive value, except those the chamber expressly
rejected as insufficient-those we know, but of the rest, nothing.
For if the Decision cannot bear the weight ofjudgment and cannot perform the authoritative functions of judgment, how can the
raw evidence itself do these things? One can review the Decision's
review of the evidence, but what can one say at the end? That he
finds it persuasive? That he agrees or disagrees with the chamber's
gloss? Perhaps, but nothing more. All we can say about this evidence-as an element of the Decision-is that it was not so insufficient, so ludicrous, as to compel the chamber to order acquittal.
The evidence has no more juridical value, and no more interpretative value, apart from being a kind of summary. If it is to contribute to a transformative narrative and to reconciliation, that
evidence will have to be deployed in other ways, according to other
theories about how post-conflict communities reach consensus on
divisive issues.
VI.

A.

CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF JUDGMENT

Authority after Death-Non-Legal Narratives

The radically limited utility of the Decision does not mean that a
terminated trial cannot contribute to goals of transformation and
reconciliation in any way. Advocates of the narrative theory do not
argue that a single trial, alone, produces the full complexity ofjudicial truth. The events of the Miloevic trial have been adjudicated
in other cases before the ICTY, as well as in domestic war crimes
trials, which may both rely on its evidence and, in their own proceedings, cast light on issues that were not resolved. 24 7 Of course,
many of the same constraints that operated for the ICJ in
deploying the Decision or the evidence from Milogevic apply equally
for those trials; if they do contribute to the creation of narrative, it
is more likely in parallel, rather than that the Miloevic trial as a
248
process is making a direct contribution to those trials.
247. Significant trials that overlap with Miloevi include the MOS trial (for Kosovo) and
Stanisie/Simatovieand Karadz2ie (for Bosnia). See Prosecutor v. Milutinovie, Case No. IT-9937-PT, Third Amended Indictment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 19,
2002); Prosecutor v. Stanigit, Case No. IT-03-69, Indictment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 1, 2003); Prosecutor v. Karadik, Case No. IT-95-5/18-1, Amended
Indictment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 28, 2000).
248. Although there are provisions for international tribunals to use adjudicated facts,
these are quite limited; evidence presented in Milo~evie cannot simply be imported into
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Instead, processes outside of the formal legal system may have
greater flexibility in deploying the evidence and Decision. Independent legal analysis and history writing provide alternative ways
of producing narratives that can do at least as much informational
and persuasive work as a legal judgment. The Human Rights
Watch report Weighing the Evidence represents a strong example of
the claim that the trial process and materials have considerable
value on their own. Weighing the Evidence cites extensively from the
trial evidence, principally from the prosecution phase, to build an
argument about what happened during the Yugoslav wars and who
was responsible. The report describes its own standard of review:
Human Rights Watch did not attempt an exhaustive review of
the evidence introduced a [sic] trial. Human Rights Watch did
consider Milosevic's cross-examination and defense and we did
not include evidence where we felt Milosevic had raised valid
questions in rebuttal as to the value of the evidence. 249
This is a quasi-judicial standard, although one admittedly conducted at a remove and without any capacity to intervene in the
give-and-take between prosecution and defense. The report
reviews the evidence de novo, not filtering it through the Decision,
although it often could have. 2 50 This asserts the autonomous value
of the evidence, which can be evaluated substantively, without reference to the chamber's formalistic review standards. Indeed, in
theory, an outside observer like Human Rights Watch could disagree with the Decision about the evidence: even if the chamber
threw out a particular allegation, Human Rights Watch could in
effect "reinstate" it in its own analysis; equally, it could "acquit"
Milogevic on a count that the chamber upheld. 25 1
other trials, because of the procedural and fairness commitments of the adversarial trial
model.
249.

HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 64, at 16. This is a filter that the Trial Chamber,

taking the prosecution evidence at its highest, did not apply.
250. For example, on Belgrade's financial and material assistance to the Croatian and
Bosnian Serb armies, both the Decision and the HRW report mention statements by Ratko
Mladit, testimony from General Vgh, the plan of supply codenamed "Izvor," and testimony by Dr. Williams. See id. at 16, 36-37; Prosecutor v. Milogevie, Case No. IT-02-54-T,
Decision on Motion forJudgement of Acquittal, 1 261, 273, 271, 258 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia June 16, 2004), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodanmilosevic/tdec/en/040616.htm.
251. I have not found any instance of the report actually doing this. This may be mere
coincidence, but it may represent a kind of gravitational effect of the Decision on how
outside analysts weigh evidence. In any event, it would be interesting to consider how
other actors might have approached the underlying evidence in Milofevic if there had
never been a Decision (either because Milogevic had died before one had issued, or
because the ICTYs Rules had not contemplated one).
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Likewise, narrative accounts of the trial, like Boas' and
Armatta's, 25 2 which draw on the trial evidence but also on data and
analysis of the whole trial process and the broader conflict in the
former Yugoslavia, may in time produce accounts that embed
themselves in popular memory as definitive retellings of Milogevic's
(and his regime's) responsibility. So far these works have been
produced by insiders or close observers of the trial, but the enormous Miloevic archive is-or rather will be 2 3-a rich source for
historians and other analysts; from it, they can construct accounts
that, through their coherence and persuasiveness, can acquire a
kind of authority. This means the trial could, indirectly, contribute
to the kinds of processes that the authoritative narrative theory
contemplates: "In time, evidence introduced in the Milogevic case
may go some way toward vindicating these hopes [for recognition
of crimes in Serbia]. Scholars and non-governmental organizations have begun what will likely be a long process of reclaiming
that evidence and establishing non-judicial processes of learning
from it."'254 Thus even if the authoritative narrative theory in its
pure form cannot extract value from a terminated trial, other nar255
rative forms may be possible, and may be efficacious.
But whatever their effects, advocacy and scholarship of these
forms will, of necessity, contribute to an entirely different genus of
authority than the specific kind that is supposed to be afforded by
judgment. A report like Weighing the Evidence or archival work by
scholars demonstrates both what can be achieved through private
252.

ARMATrA, supra note 5; BOAS, supra note 14.

253. Planning to preserve the ICTY archives and ensure access to them is ongoing;
however, it is unlikely that all material, including the most sensitive material, will be
released in the near future. See Robert Donia, ICTY Archive Must be Open to All INST. FOR
WAR & PEACE REPORTING (Apr. 4, 2008), http://www.iwpr.net/?p=tri&s=f&o=343812&apcstate=henh.
254. ORENTLICHER, supra note 37, at 73; see also WILSON, supra note19.
255. It would be interesting to consider a thought experiment: Imagine a team of
respected outside actors assiduously working to duplicate and complete the trial, sifting
through the evidence and drafting comprehensive conclusions about Milogevic's guilt or
innocence. Assuming they had full access to the record, there is no reason to think their
conclusions would be any less accurate or informed than those of the actual judges. Their
effort might produce a definitive account that was widely accepted (in part due to the
integrity and rigor of its process) and even exert a transformative influence. Of course, it
would be subject to the same practical constraint that underlies the doctrinal reasons for
terminating trials when defendants die - its evaluation could not include arguments and
evidence Milogevic was unable to introduce because of his death. The team would be compelled to acknowledge the incompleteness, and therefore, the indeterminacy, in its analysis. But such a thought experiment would be very useful in considering what, exactly, is the
source and nature of transformative power, if any, in final judgments. Thanks to Prof.
Nancy Combs for suggesting this.
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evaluation of evidence and the limits of that effort, which are precisely defined by the lack of authoritative imprimatur. Anyone can
review evidence; it is not the facts produced at trial, but their legal
characterization that matters to the particular kind of authoritative
narrative ICL is supposed to produce. Historians and legal scholars
can contest a court's findings, reinterpret evidence, and even contest authoritative rulings; as cases like Yamashita demonstrate, the
aggregated opinion of scholars and historians can outweigh a technically authoritative legal judgment. 25 6 Yet claiming too broad a
scope for lay reinterpretation undercuts the original argument for
trials, which is that legal decisions contribute specially to judgment,
narrative and reconciliation. Any outcome arrived at without
going through the forensic processes of formal trial does not, by
definition, create the desired effect, the particular effect with
which we are concerned. In this sense, other approaches simply
recapitulate the problem of authority.
B.

Neither in Death nor in Life-Justice without Transformation?

The unproductive fate of the Decision and the constricted horizons of the Milo~evic trial as a whole certainly suggest the tenuous
nature of ICL's still immature project: so much can depend on a
single trial whose outcome, in turn, depends on the health of a
single defendant. In a domestic court system, in which thousands
of criminal cases may be processed each year, a few terminated
cases will not have a large effect. In a small, young system like the
ICTY-or any of the current ICL projects-a few terminated cases
are a sizable and disruptive fraction of the whole.
Still, precisely because ICL is a young project, it is difficult to
reach confident and empirically grounded conclusions about its
effects. A terminated trial like Milogevic clearly cannot accomplish
what the authoritative narrative theory expects and intends. What
is not clear, however, is whether even final judgments can. As we
have seen, after fifteen years, there is little evidence in the former
Yugoslavia of the effects the authoritative narrative theory would
predict. Does the Decision tell us anything about whether the
broader theory of authoritative narrative is right? Did the Miloevic
trial fail to contribute to reconciliation only because it was prematurely terminated, or did it share broader structural constraints
256. See RicHCRD L. LAEL, THE YAMASHITA PRECEDENT: WAR CRIMES AND COMMAND
RESPONSIBILITY 137-42 (1982); B.V.A ROLING, THE TOKYO TRIAL AND BEYOND 85-89
(Antonio Cassese ed., 1993); Ann Marie Prhvost, Race and War Crimes: The 1945 War Crimes
Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, 14 HUM. RTs. Q. 303, 335-38 (1992).
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with other trials that would have limited its effect even if it had
reached final judgment?
This Article only makes a limited contribution towards answering
that question. The two most critical features of the Decision are its
interim quality and the trial's termination; it would overreach to
derive from them a claim about the effect of final judgmentabout whether the authoritative narrative theory works or not.
However, this Article's inquiry into the specific relationship
between terminated trials and the authoritative narrative theory
does make some useful contributions to framing an investigation of
the broader theoretical claim, by removing some confounding factors from the puzzle of narrative reconciliation's absence.
First, a close explication of the Decision demonstrates just how
structurally insufficient anything other than final judgment is to
support the creation of authoritative narrative. If authoritative narrative of the kind the theory predicts were generated by other parts
of a trial, their effect should appear even in terminated cases such
as Miloevic, but it does not.2 57 This still does not answer the theoretical question-it does not tell us if final judgments actually are
efficacious-but it demonstrates that final judgments are the only
plausible locus for further investigation of the narrative theory's
258
effects.
Second, this Article further clarifies that investigation's proper
scope, because although we know terminated trials do not contribute to authoritative narrative, we also know this cannot be the reason for more general failure of reconciliation in the former
Yugoslavia. If most trials ended prematurely, we might speculate
that this was limiting ICL's reconciliatory effects. But although terminated trials are a real, endemic problem, they are not the norm;
most trials reach completion and final judgment, and therefore
should have done something, if they do anything.
257. I am referring to the lack of a specific authoritative effect. As noted in discussing
the defense of the authoritative narrative theory and in Part VI.A., incomplete trials have
other effects and their evidence may be useful in other contexts, such as history-writing.
But none of these other outcomes produce an authoritative narrative of the specifically
legal kind, which, the theory claims, has different effects. And if these other outcomes do
produce the same or equivalent effects as a finaljudgment, this only begs the question: why
have trials exactly-why not rely on these other methods?
258. The only other candidate occasionally advanced is time-the claim that, precisely
because ICL is a young field, its trials and institutions have not yet had time to effect
reconciliation, whether through narrative means or otherwise. Personally, I think fifteen
years should be long enough to see some effect, but more to the point, we should recognize that this argument-though it may be right-is not falsifiable, at least not yet. Future
effect is always a possible explanation.
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I am skeptical about the special ability of international trials to
create or significantly contribute to anything like a transformative
narrative, and intend to explore that question in a subsequent article. This Article-more precise and forensic in its aims-has explicated the relationship of the Miloevic Decision to claims that justify
ICL as a source of post-conflict reconciliation, and has shown the
Decision's structural incapacity to act as an authoritative narrative.
This Article has focused on the specific problem of terminated trials, but in doing so it has helped defined the parameters of the
general theoretical question towards which the Decision points us,
which concerns the authoritative narrative theory itself. The Decision-that imperfect, interim document-by its very imperfection
suggests the need to examine the sufficiency, not of its own transformative potential, but of the idea itself.

